The triviality argument against presentism

Abstract

Presentism is typically characterised as the thesis that everything (unre-strictedly

Characterising Theories of Time and Modality

“…We now have an explanation for the above quotation: when Cameron writes 'I suspect the best version of presentism is one on which to be present just is to exist' what he means is that given the typical antecedent theoretical commitments of a certain kind of selfdescribed 'Presentist', the claim that everything is present is equivalent to the logical truth that everything exists. And given that Cameron's own antecedent theoretical commitments differ from those of such a self-described 'Presentist', he does not hold that the claim that 31 Deasy (2017) rejects this interpretation on these grounds. 32 On Cameron's view objects and events are permanent, but there are temporary states of affairs.…”

“…For example, Williamson (2013, 22-5) makes the case against the traditional debates by considering and rejecting a number of candidate interpretations of the standard definitions of Presentism and Actualism. 2 Deasy (2017) describes and rejects further candidate interpretations of the standard definition of Presentism. However, the case made by Williamson and Deasy is not entirely negative: they agree that the Presentism-Eternalism debate should give way to the Temporaryism-Permanentism debate, and the Actualism-Possibilism debate should give way to the Contingentism-Necessitism debate.…”

“… There is a distinct doubt about the substance of the traditional Presentism–Eternalism debate centred on the question of whether the copula ‘is’ in the standard definition of Presentism should be read as ‘tensed’ or ‘tenseless’ – see, for example, Crisp (), Ludlow (), Meyer (), Sakon () and Deasy (forthcoming in Synthese ). This is not the worry about the traditional debate that I have in mind here. …”

Memoro Ergo Sum

“…To support the reader, we list here a few references, which investigate the ontological and logical aspects of this interpretation, such as Refs. [29], [30], [31] [32], [33], [34], [35], [31], [36], [37], [38], [39] and [40].…”

Presentism, eternalism and where things are located

“…Eternalists hold that, in addition, dinosaurs and other non-present things exist. In several recent papers, Daniel Deasy (2017aDeasy ( , 2017b has argued that this debate is misguided and should be abandoned. Rather than investigating whether non-present things exist, philosophers of time should turn to the following question: Do things come into existence and go out of existence?…”