The truth about lying

Turri, Angelo; Turri, John

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.01.007

Cited by 52 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Based on participant judgments of several stories, Coleman and Kay () proposed that lie may work best as a prototype, with a “prototypical” lie instantiating all three of the following criteria: the proposition p is false, the speaker believes p to be false, the speaker utters p with the intention of deceiving the hearer—although utterances instantiating only one or two of these criteria may also be rated as lies. Their results suggested the following ranking of the three criteria in decreasing order of importance: “believe false,” “intent to deceive,” and “actually false.” Using a similar methodology, Turri and Turri () found that actual falsity, despite being the least important of the three criteria in the original Coleman and Kay study, is, in fact, required for an utterance to be considered a lie (so long as the other two are also met). However, a follow‐up study by Wiegmann, Samland and Waldmann () argues convincingly that the Turri and Turri experiments guided participants towards a particular answer, and a re‐worked series of experiments suggest that “objective falsity” (Turri & Turri, , p. 162) is not, in fact, required for lying.…”

Section: Lying Between Truth Morality and Culturementioning

confidence: 99%

Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation

Weissman

Terkourafi

2018

Mind & Language

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Lies are typically defined as believed falsehoods asserted with the intention of deceiving the hearer. A particularly problematic case for this definition is that of false implicatures. These are prototypically cases where the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance is true, yet an implicature conveyed by this proposition in context is false. However, implicature is a diverse category and whether a blanket statement such as “false implicatures are lies,” as some have argued can account for all of them is open to investigation. We present an experimental investigation of whether naïve participants define different types of implicatures as lies. Our results show that only a couple of types of implicatures were strongly rated as lies by participants. These results suggest that participants distinguish between different types of communicated meanings on linguistic grounds, contributing both to the literature on lying, as well as to theoretical discussions of how different types of meaning are communicated.

show abstract

Section: Lying Between Truth Morality and Culturementioning

confidence: 99%

Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation

Weissman

Terkourafi

2018

Mind & Language

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For more recent studies, see e.g. Arico & Fallis (2013), Turri & Turri (2015), Marsili (2016), Wiegmann, Samland, & Waldmann (2016), Meibauer (2016), Rutschmann & Wiegmann (2017) and Wiegmann & Willemsen (2017). 9 Marsili (2016) investigates whether speakers can lie with promises, and thus with non-assertive speech-acts.…”

Section: John's Mercedesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation

Viebahn¹,

Wiegmann²,

Engelmann³

et al. 2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can a question be a lie? Theorists in the debate on how to define lying tend to answer this question negatively. They hold that questions can be misleading, but that they cannot be lies. The aim of this paper is to show that ordinary speakers disagree. With the help of three experiments, we show that ordinary speakers judge certain insincere questions to be lies. These judgements are robust and remain so when the participants are given the possibility of classifying the questions as misleading or deceiving without being a lie. Judgments about insincere questions pattern with judgements participants make about declarative lies. And they contrast with judgements participants give about prototypical cases of misleading or deceptive behaviour.

show abstract

“…Many prominent philosophers still hold the traditional account and several studies suggest that most people, children and adults equally, think that deception or the intention to deceive is necessary for lying (Lindskold and Han ; Peterson ; Lee and Ross ; Taylor et al ; Meibauer ; see Turri and Turri , pp. 161–162).…”

Section: Lying and Deceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

Krstic

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible.

show abstract

The truth about lying

Cited by 52 publications

References 39 publications

Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation

Are false implicatures lies? An empirical investigation

Can a question be a lie? An empirical investigation

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About