2000
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-940x.2000.00077.x
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Two‐Mode Problem: Second‐Best Pricing and Capacity

Abstract: Suppose that there are two congestible modes of travel from A to B -road and rail for concreteness -which are imperfect substitutes in demand. Road congestion from A to B is underpriced; this is an unalterable distortion. Compared to the first best, should the transportation planner choose a wider or narrower road, raise or lower the rail fare, and expand or contract rail capacity? This paper provides a synthetic review of the literature on the problem, presents some new results, and discusses directions for f… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
35
0

Year Published

2001
2001
2019
2019

Publication Types

Select...
7
2

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 79 publications
(37 citation statements)
references
References 13 publications
2
35
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Note that a differentiation in price by distance is more attractive if destination choice is included as well; otherwise the model would overestimate the revenue from long-distance travellers, some of whom would try to travel shorter distances. Our model also ignores issues of income distribution (Dodgson and Topham, 1987;Mayeres and Proost, 1997), heterogeneity in the value of time savings (Verhoef and Small, 2004) and that road capacity may also be endogenous (De Borger and Wouters, 1998;Arnott and Yan, 2000), all dimensions that are promising venues of further research for the analysis of marginal cost pricing and optimal public transport design including congestion and crowding externalities. Finally, regarding the number of seats as a variable, the bus operator cost structure could include differences in capital and maintenance costs due to alternative standing and seating configurations.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Note that a differentiation in price by distance is more attractive if destination choice is included as well; otherwise the model would overestimate the revenue from long-distance travellers, some of whom would try to travel shorter distances. Our model also ignores issues of income distribution (Dodgson and Topham, 1987;Mayeres and Proost, 1997), heterogeneity in the value of time savings (Verhoef and Small, 2004) and that road capacity may also be endogenous (De Borger and Wouters, 1998;Arnott and Yan, 2000), all dimensions that are promising venues of further research for the analysis of marginal cost pricing and optimal public transport design including congestion and crowding externalities. Finally, regarding the number of seats as a variable, the bus operator cost structure could include differences in capital and maintenance costs due to alternative standing and seating configurations.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Crowding as a factor that affects the users' utility and generalised cost of travelling has been recognised by several authors in the analysis of public transport pricing and supply policy (Jansson, 1979;Kraus, 1991;Jansson, 1993;Arnott and Yan, 2000;Huang, 2002;Pedersen, 2003;Pels and Verhoef, 2007;Parry and Small, 2009). The basic idea is that when a person boards a bus or a train, they may impose a crowding externality on everyone else on board, which is especially noticeable when there are passengers standing.…”
Section: Effect On Optimal Public Transport Supply and Farementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such practice is dubbed "naïve cost benefit analysis". Arnott and Yan (2000) show that in the standard static model, naïve CBA leads unambiguously to overestimation of the benefit from expansion and hence to excessive investment. Indeed, they show using a plausible numerical example that the capacity chosen using naïve CBA can exceed second-best optimal capacity by more than second-best capacity exceeds first-best capacity.…”
Section: Congestion Pricing and Investmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But because underpricing of congestion results in greater usage, the direct benefit of a capacity expansion is higher than in the first best. The net effect of these opposing forces has been investigated extensively in the literature; Arnott and Yan (2000) provide an insightful review and synthesis. One result is that if a toll is reduced slightly below the first-best level, optimal capacity rises because the increase in the positive direct effect dominates the increase in the negative indirect effect.…”
Section: Congestion Pricing and Investmentmentioning
confidence: 99%