Can an insecure regime use nuclear diversion to address its eroding domestic legitimacy? This article argues that facing a domestic legitimacy crisis, a regime might opt to "rally round the nuclear flag" to survive. Theoretically, I argue that, compared with conventional diversion, nuclear diversion is less susceptible to structural restraints, has a unique symbolic value that could aid in coping with an acute legitimacy crisis, and spans a host of diversionary strategies as it ascends the escalation ladder, both before and after acquiring the bomb. The theory is examined empirically via Iranian nuclear policy. I argue that facing a deepening legitimacy crisis, the Iranian regime, throughout Ahmadinejad's tenure, has been increasingly drawing on nuclear diversion to boost public support and that, if the legitimacy crisis lingers, the regime may opt to further employ diversionary nuclear strategies, most of which require a viable "nuclear latency," rather than actual military nuclear capability.What are the causes and reasons for "going nuclear"? Among the myriad explanations, this article focuses on one: domestic legitimacy crisis. I explore this rarely analyzed motivation to go nuclear, suggesting that an insecure regime can use nuclear diversion to address its eroding domestic legitimacy. Nuclear diversion theory complements prevalent arguments regarding the drivers of nuclear proliferation, which accentuate economic incentives, deterrence and compellence, prestige and status, identity politics, parochial interests, and international norms (Brown et al.