2010
DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2010.485842
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The Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2010

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Cited by 6 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…In August 2004, the presidential campaign of contender Viktor Yushchenko had announced his intention to increase pensions in the event of winning the election. As the campaign of incumbent Viktor Yanukovych lacked promises concerning pension generosity, the government anticipated this challenge with a quick pension rise (Copsey, 2006). In order not to scare other population groups off, the new generosity was not financed through increases in taxes or pension contribution rates.…”
Section: The Unexpected Legal Minimum Pension Increase In Ukrainementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In August 2004, the presidential campaign of contender Viktor Yushchenko had announced his intention to increase pensions in the event of winning the election. As the campaign of incumbent Viktor Yanukovych lacked promises concerning pension generosity, the government anticipated this challenge with a quick pension rise (Copsey, 2006). In order not to scare other population groups off, the new generosity was not financed through increases in taxes or pension contribution rates.…”
Section: The Unexpected Legal Minimum Pension Increase In Ukrainementioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, they used to be more active and more interested in politics (Wolczuk, 2002). The drop of turnout in western and central Ukraine in 2010 negatively affected the vote shares of opposition and increased the chances of PoR to win (Copsey & Shapovalova, 2010). The third factor was the vote for 'against all'.…”
Section: Regional Elections In Ukraine 53mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Although the decree was subsequently rescinded relations between the president and the government remained strained and prevented further progress (Pifer et al 2009). The final defeat of the Orange coalition came in January 2010 with the election of Yanukovych as president, defeating both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko who came a distant fifth with just five percent of the vote in the first round (Copsey and Shapovalova, 2010).…”
Section: Transitional Leadership In Ukrainementioning
confidence: 99%
“…It was noted above that societies divided along ethno-cultural or geographic lines can increase the likelihood of conflict between branches, as there are competing demands to be satisfied. This is reflected in the regional support bases that presidential candidates were able to draw on in the elections, with Yushchenko drawing support from the western and central regions, while Yanukovych was stronger in the south and east (Copsey and Shapovalova, 2010). These divisions played an important role in shaping the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, as they relied on different support bases.…”
Section: Yushchenko As a Failed Transitional Leaderactions And Constraintsmentioning
confidence: 99%