The ultimate determinants of central bank independence

Eijffinger, Sylvester; Schaling, Eric

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559662.007

Cited by 47 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…7) requires that the SNB provide an annual report and information on its monetary policy to the Federal Council, the parliament and the public. In summary, it is apparent on the one hand that the new act has strengthened the formal independence of the SNB, since the previous act did not explicitly refer to this at all, although, in fact, the SNB's position was extremely independent even then, as international comparative studies confirm (Cukiermann et al 1994, Eijffinger/de Haan 1998, Freitag 1999, Grilli et al 1991. On the other hand, the SNB's independence was also restricted by the new three-part accountability and information obligations, as well as the through the much more precise definition of the SNB's duties, as set forth in the fully revised Act.…”

Section: Judicial Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Swiss Consensus Democracy in Transition: A Re-analysis of Lijphart's Concept of Democracy for Switzerland from 1997 to 2007

Vatter

2008

World Political Science

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The present article addresses the question of whether Switzerland can continue to be seen as an extreme case of federal consensus democracy, as illustrated by Arend Lijphart (1999). A re-analysis of Lijphart's (1999) study of the Swiss political system from 1997 to 2007 clearly demonstrates that due to recent political-institutional changes (a decreasing number of parties, growing electoral disproportionality, increasing decentralization and deregulation of the relationship between the state and interest groups), a consensus democracy with strong tendencies toward adjustment and normalization of the original exceptional Swiss case to meet the rest of the continental European consensus democracies has emerged. This development has been further strengthened by intensified public political contestation, rising polarization between the political camps in parliament, and the weakening of the cooperative search for consensus as the dominant mode of negotiation within the government. From the perspective of international comparison, Switzerland can thus be seen henceforth as a typical example, not an extreme case, of consensus democracy.

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Section: Judicial Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Swiss Consensus Democracy in Transition: A Re-analysis of Lijphart's Concept of Democracy for Switzerland from 1997 to 2007

Vatter

2008

World Political Science

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“…And, indeed, there is an increasing tendency around the world to devolve responsibility for managing monetary policy on an independent central bank. Supporting the wisdom of this trend, the vast majority of empirical literature on the topic finds a negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation (see the literature surveys by Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996;Berger et al, 2001;Hayo and Hefeker, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Are public preferences reflected in monetary policy reaction functions?

Neuenkirch

2014

Journal of Macroeconomics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…The case for independence for monetary policy is well established (e.g., Cukierman 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993;Eijffinger and De Haan 1996).…”

Section: Consequences For Institutional Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors

Goodhart

Schoenmaker

Dasgupta³

2001

SSRN Journal

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Abstract. Using a new database covering some 91 supervisory agencies, this paper examines how important various skilled experts are in the supervisory process and the relative usage of different kinds of such experts. We seek to explore what kind of perspective supervisors in different institutional settings may adopt: a macro-oriented perspective or a more micro-approach? The answer to this question is relevant, as there is evidence that many financial crises have been macro-induced. It is found that central banks employ more economists and fewer lawyers in their supervisory/financial stability wing than non-central bank supervisory agencies. This result would indicate that an institutional setting with direct or indirect central bank involvement is more likely to produce a macro-approach. Next, there are significant economies of scale in financial supervision, though this can be measured by several alternative variables (e.g., the relative scale of bank intermediation). Finally, there do not appear to be major economies of scope. A more complex financial system with a well-developed stock market would need both more supervisors as well as more skilled ones.JEL classification: G28, E58, O40.

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The ultimate determinants of central bank independence

Cited by 47 publications

References 21 publications

Swiss Consensus Democracy in Transition: A Re-analysis of Lijphart's Concept of Democracy for Switzerland from 1997 to 2007

Swiss Consensus Democracy in Transition: A Re-analysis of Lijphart's Concept of Democracy for Switzerland from 1997 to 2007

Are public preferences reflected in monetary policy reaction functions?

The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors

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