The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

Abstract

This paper explores the question of what the self is by reviewing research conducted with both normal and neuropsychological participants. Findings converge on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than some previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects-for instance, semantic trait summaries-appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. In the process of reviewing neuropsychological findings, an unexpected result emerges: trait self-knowledge appears unusually robust with respect to neural and cognitive damage that render other aspects of self-knowledge dysfunctional in varying degrees.

Sense of identity in advanced Alzheimer’s dementia: A cognitive dissociation between sameness and selfhood?

“…KC also underwent a profound change of personality but, interestingly, possessed "reasonably realistic trait self-knowledge", corresponding to his present self, indicating that he had acquired new trait self-knowledge. Furthermore, this study and others (see Klein & Lax, 2010, for a review) suggest that even when episodic self-representations are Sense of identity in Alzheimer's Disease 5 lost in dense amnesic syndromes, sense of identity can still survive on semantic selfrepresentations. Determining the integrity of sense of identity is extremely worthwhile both at the theoretical level and in terms of patient care (see Caddell and Clare, 2011a, for a review of the interventions supporting self in dementia).…”

“…For Klein et al (2003), the persistence of sense of identity in AD could be explained by the relative preservation of semantic self-representations, which include personality traits. They argued that semantic trait self-knowledge is the most resistant to the cognitive chaos resulting from developmental and/or environmental damage to the brain, but failed to offer any explanation for this, concluding that it remained a mystery (Klein & Lax, 2010). To sum up, research suggests that some components of self in AD patients are increasingly damaged as the disease progresses, while others seem to be preserved, at least in part.…”

“…We hypothesize that these self-descriptions may have concerned key aspects of the patients" self-concept, in other words, their sense of identity. These key self-descriptions may thus have been more resistant to cognitive damage (see Klein & Lax, 2010), but at the same time, they may have been more rigid and rudimentary, and, like verbal stereotypes, benefited from an easy and fast mental access.…”

“…Taken together, these results suggest that sense of identity is resistant to neural and cognitive damage, such as that observed in severe episodic memory disorders. Some authors (see Klein & Lax, 2010, for a review) argue that the self-representations of AD patients are preserved, but not updated.…”

Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection

“…For instance, the contention that episodic, but not semantic, memory entails a self-referential component has given way to the well-documented finding that semantic memory also can be selfreferential (for reviews see Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014;Klein, 2004;Klein & Lax, 2010;Klein & Loftus, 1993;Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovich, & Levine, 2012).…”