The Unequal Enforcement of Liberalization: Evidence From Russia's Reform of Business Regulation

Yakovlev, Evgeny; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina

doi:10.1111/jeea.12026

Cited by 65 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Public procurement processes and regulations would in turn not impose sufficient pressure for the development of effective firm strategies, firm restructuring, and employee empowerment, resulting in lower management quality. For example, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2013) show that the most corrupt regions in Russia delay or circumvent the implementation of liberalization policies.…”

Section: Theoretical Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence

Athanasouli

Goujard

2015

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Available online xxx JEL Classfication: H11 K42 L2 Keywords: Management Institutions Corruption Firm governance a b s t r a c t Athanasouli, Daphne, and Goujard, Antoine-Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidenceWe argue that corruption can decrease aggregate productivity by deteriorating firm management practices. We investigate the impact of regional corruption on the management quality of firms within the manufacturing sector in Central and Eastern Europe. The empirical challenge is that bureaucrats' bribing practices may evolve in response to firm behaviors, and that regional corruption is measured with error. To identify causal effects, our preferred specifications use a difference-in-differences methodology. We measure the manufacturing industries' exposure to corruption using their level of dependence to contract institutions. Controlling for regional and manufacturing industry -country fixed effects, we find that firms in more contract dependent industries, located in more corrupt regions, tend to have lower management quality, a more centralized decision-making process, and a lower level of education among administrative staff. In more corrupt regions, contract dependent firms are also characterized by lower investment in R&D, and smaller product markets. We show that our findings are not likely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality. Journal of Comparative Economics 000 () (2015) 1-21.

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Section: Theoretical Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence

Athanasouli

Goujard

2015

Journal of Comparative Economics

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“…Djankov et al (2002) show that countries with high start-up regulations have high levels of corruption and low qualities of public or private goods. A number of studies (e.g., Bruhn 2011;Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2013) found that reforms in entry regulations can increase competition and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Yet, there is also a positive aspect of entry regulations.…”

Section: Start-up Costs and Innovative Entrepreneurshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxes, start-up costs, and innovative entrepreneurship

et al. 2018

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Prior research investigates the role of start-up costs and taxes with regard to entrepreneurship. Yet, little distinction is made regarding the type of entrepreneurship, particularly innovative versus non-innovative entrepreneurship. We shall argue that start-up costs and taxes are associated in different ways with innovative versus non-innovative entrepreneurship. Taxes being recurring costs should mainly relate to innovative entrepreneurship, whereas start-up costs being one-off costs should mainly relate to non-innovative entrepreneurship. Analyzing a dataset of 632,116 individuals, including 43,223 entrepreneurs from 53 countries, we can partially confirm our predictions. Corporate taxes show a negative relationship with innovative entrepreneurship, whereas income taxes seem to have no relationship. High start-up costs have a positive relationship with innovative entrepreneurship, although this finding only holds true in cross-sectional investigations. Our paper contributes to the discussion on how governmental regulation and taxes relate to entrepreneurship.

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“…4 This also relates to the longstanding literature on competition and productivity (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). See, e.g., Schmidt (1997); Boone (2000); Raith (2003); Vives (2004), and Aghion et al (2005a) for theoretical contributions, and Porter (1990); MacDonald (1994); Nickell (1996); Blundell and Van Reenen (1999); Sivadasan (2004);and Aghion et al (2009) Aghion et al, 2008;Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya, 2012). The current paper complements this literature by focusing on heterogeneous effects of local market regulations in a country with strong institutions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 73%

A Dynamic Analysis of Regulation and Productivity in Retail Trade

Maican

Orth

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Liberalization is widely recognized to drive productivity growth. Retail trade is often thought to substantially contribute to the frequently debated productivity gap between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, entry regulations empower local authorities to decide on the entry of new stores. We use a dynamic structural model and data on all retail stores in Sweden during the period 1996-2002 to quantify the effect of entry regulations on productivity in retail. The results show that the approval of an additional application by local authorities increases median productivity by approximately 2 percent in most subsectors. A stricter regulation in terms of one fewer approved application in each local market corresponds to an annual economic cost for the retail trade sector of nearly 10 percent of total annual capital investments. Our findings suggest that a restrictive entry regulation limits the role of entry and exit in local market dynamics and productivity growth. Terms of use: Documents in

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The Unequal Enforcement of Liberalization: Evidence From Russia's Reform of Business Regulation

Cited by 65 publications

References 35 publications

Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence

Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence

Taxes, start-up costs, and innovative entrepreneurship

A Dynamic Analysis of Regulation and Productivity in Retail Trade

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