1990
DOI: 10.1007/bf00383215
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The unethical exploitation of shareholders in management buyout transactions

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Cited by 21 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…14 Lowenstein (1985) argues that, when management is the acquiring party, it may employ specific accounting techniques to depress the pre-announcement share price (see also Schadler and Karns, 1990). By manipulating dividends, refusing to meet with security analysts or even deliberately depressing earnings, managers can use the information asymmetry to their advantage prior to an MBO or IBO.…”
Section: The Undervaluation Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 95%
“…14 Lowenstein (1985) argues that, when management is the acquiring party, it may employ specific accounting techniques to depress the pre-announcement share price (see also Schadler and Karns, 1990). By manipulating dividends, refusing to meet with security analysts or even deliberately depressing earnings, managers can use the information asymmetry to their advantage prior to an MBO or IBO.…”
Section: The Undervaluation Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 95%
“…12 Lowenstein (1985) argues that, when management is the acquiring party, it may employ specific accounting techniques to depress the pre-announcement share price (see also Schadler and Karns, 1990). By manipulating dividends, refusing to meet with security analysts or even deliberately depressing earnings, managers can use the information asymmetry to their advantage prior to an MBO or IBO.…”
Section: The Undervaluation Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This problem may be exacerbated when listed corporations, especially smaller ones, find it troublesome to use the equity market to fund expansion, as it may be difficult to attract the interest of institutional shareholders, analysts, and fund managers. Lowenstein (1985) argues that, when the management is the acquiring party, it may employ specific accounting and finance techniques to depress the pre-announcement share price (Schadler and Karns (1990)). By manipulating dividends, manipulating balance sheets through asset revaluation, refusing to meet with security analysts or even deliberately depressing earnings, managers can use the information asymmetry to their advantage prior to an MBO.…”
Section: Undervaluation Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%