The Unforeseen 2012 Crisis in Mali: The Diverging Outcomes of Risk and Threat Analyses

Abstract

The 2012 crisis in Mali, where the state collapsed and terrorist groups took over the north, came as a surprise to many. Mali had been considered a poster-child for democracy and was judged as considerably more stable than its neighbors by leading quantitative indices of state fragility. This article explores how quantitative risk and qualitative threat approaches led to incomplete analyses, and how bureaucratic processes stifled a holistic diagnosis of the situation in Mali. French and Dutch government views are analyzed, adding new empirical information on how ministries and embassies were unwilling to call out disconcerting developments in Mali.

The Routledge Handbook of Smuggling

“…The NATO intervention therefore not only collapsed the Libyan state, but also catalyzed the civil war in Mali (Ronen, 2013;Shaw, 2013). The evidence suggests that returning diaspora fighters from Libya joined forces with Tuareg rebels and their new AQIM allies, and in 2012, launched a countrywide separatist campaign (Boeke and de Valk, 2019). Since this uprising, Mali has become one of the most dangerous and extreme conflict zones in the world today.…”

Mali: desk study on aid and democracy

“…There are many arguments as to why Mali, once considered a democratic f avourite, suf f ered such a stark reversal of democracy in 2012. The literature has since attributed Mali's political shortcomings and regime reversal to a variety of structural and political causes including: poor governance practices (Allen 2013); weak legislatures (Van Vliet 2014); a growing gap between political elites and the population ( Van de Walle 2012; Elischer and Lawrance 2022); a broader 'pandemic of coups' brought upon by systemic global conditions (Zulueta-Fülscher and Noël 2021); the ongoing security threats, civil conf lict, and insurgency within the country (Bøås and Torheim 2013;Boeke and De Valk 2021), andnotably-the role of f oreign assistance and international aid donors (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Van de Walle 2012; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013). Mali's citizens may also have played a role.…”

“…On the one hand, some research suggests that international aid donors and external actors were unaware of the f ull extent of Mali's vulnerable political system and the potential role they played in it (Allen 2013;Esquith 2013). On the other hand, other research suggests that international donors were well aware of these f laws, yet continued to pour aid into the country regardless (Boeke and De Valk 2021). Faulty donor assessments about Mali's robust democratic status may also have been the product of a mismatch of available data on the country.…”

“…Faulty donor assessments about Mali's robust democratic status may also have been the product of a mismatch of available data on the country. Quantitative data weakly capture inf ormal arrangements and processes, qualitative data are of ten unverif iable and subject to bias, and empirical data collected by practitioners and scholars of ten prioritize state agendas over local grievances (Bleck and Michelitch 2015;Boeke and De Valk 2021). 3 Either way, the events of 2012 exposed serious gaps in political transparency, institutional capacity, and government accountability in the country and began to shed light on the role that the international community played in both contributing to this crisis and responding to it.…”