2020
DOI: 10.25159/1947-9417/6688
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The Unintended Consequences of Using Direct Incentives to Drive the Complex Task of Research Dissemination

Abstract: Universities have used an array of incentives to increase academic publications, which are highly rewarded in the South African higher education funding formula. While all universities use indirect incentives, such as linking promotion and probation to publication, the mechanisms used in some institutions have taken a very direct form, whereby authors are paid to publish. This process has paralleled a large rise in publication outputs alongside increased concerns about quality. Significantly, there are ethical… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…Yet thinking about how to reform the academic pipeline for postdocs also opens up much larger questions about the purpose and structure of the academic profession in a system which instrumentalises and disempowers academics (Janz 2015;Harley 2017), and wears them down by simple overwork. There is already a critical discussion happening about the perverse effects of rankings and research incentives (Maistry 2019;Muller 2017;Muthama and McKenna 2020), and this should expand to the problem of a casualised academic workforce. Another part of the problem is that because postdocs are not university employees, we do not participate in any decision-making or governance structures of the university, so we do not see at first-hand how the university is really run, and we lose opportunities to connect with employed academics.…”
Section: What Is To Be Done? Conclusion Caveats and Recommendationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet thinking about how to reform the academic pipeline for postdocs also opens up much larger questions about the purpose and structure of the academic profession in a system which instrumentalises and disempowers academics (Janz 2015;Harley 2017), and wears them down by simple overwork. There is already a critical discussion happening about the perverse effects of rankings and research incentives (Maistry 2019;Muller 2017;Muthama and McKenna 2020), and this should expand to the problem of a casualised academic workforce. Another part of the problem is that because postdocs are not university employees, we do not participate in any decision-making or governance structures of the university, so we do not see at first-hand how the university is really run, and we lose opportunities to connect with employed academics.…”
Section: What Is To Be Done? Conclusion Caveats and Recommendationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another important problem of researcher assessments is their tendency to value quantity over quality. Many researchers feel encouraged to publish as many papers as possible and are sometimes offered tangible incentives such as financial rewards to publish more [41,42]. Assessing researchers on the number of published papers does indeed lead to more publications, but it tends to do so at the detriment of research quality [6,43].…”
Section: Quantity Over Qualitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Muthama and McKenna (2020:18) argue that a change to the DHET subsidy regime is required, rather than blaming individual academics for their “poor choices.” We also argue that a change to the DHET subsidy regime is necessary and that in its current form provides strong incentives for predatory publishing by academics. Nevertheless, if academics are aware of what they are doing in submitting to a predatory journal then this must be considered fraud.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%