The Unitary Executive

Abstract

This chapter examines the theory of the unitary executive and its deployment in the Trump presidency afgainst the specter of a Deep State. The theory asserts that the president possesses all the executive power, that the incumbent alone is the executive branch. The idea is that anything less than complete control over administration by that individual risks an obfuscation of responsibility, clouding the judgments on presidential performance that “the people” get to deliver retrospectively in the next election. This reading of the Constitution is often joined to a strikingly plebiscitary conception of American democracy. This chapter takes up two issues of special interest. The first is an alternative “republican reading” of the Constitution which anticipates inter-branch collaboration in the control of administrative power. The second is the relationship between the vesting clause of Article II, on which the unitary theory is based, and the selection procedure, which has changed radically since its original constitutional formulation. The chapter concludes by pointing to the distortions of constitutional meaning introduced by joining an expansive reading of the vesting clause to contemporary selection mechanisms.

Mobilizing the White: White Nationalism and Congressional Politics in the American South

“…civil rights, fiscal policy, foreign military engagements, gun control, international trade), the resulting index differs in important and significant ways from more general measures of conservatism. For instance, the JBS Freedom Index “scorecard” for the 2020 Congressional session emphasizes votes the JBS considers “crucial elements of the ongoing Deep State war against America,” a conspiratorial trope which has gained prominence in far-right circles in recent years but has long been at the center of the JBS’s policy agenda (Linden et al, 2021; Skowronek et al, 2021). 15…”

Presidential Investment in the Administrative State

“…Likewise, we should observe a greater willingness to deplete capacity during Republican administrations due to conservative preferences for small government. This partisan or ideological view draws support from the recent experience of the Trump Administration (see, e.g., Freeman and Jacobs 2021; Skowronek, Dearborn, and King 2021). Like other conservative administrations (Durant 1992), the Trump Administration sought to advance a deregulatory agenda by dismantling the effectiveness of the federal bureaucracy (Parshall and Twombly 2020).…”

“…Increasing capacity requires presidents and their staff to identify capable leaders, advocate for targeted appropriations, and mitigate procedural constraints that impact performance. Deconstruction may require presidents to find ways to circumvent civil service laws, cut budgets, or flood an agency with busy work (Freeman and Jacobs 2021; Parshall and Twombly 2020; Skowronek, Dearborn, and King 2021). The sheer size of the administrative state prevents presidents from meaningfully investing in every agency.…”

Status and expertise: A typology of US presidential transition team members

“…Not surprisingly, a similar partisan dimension exacerbates these trends for Democratic and Republican appointees. Also, not surprisingly, candidate and then president Donald Trump fomented these divisions with his ongoing campaign against the so-called "Deep State" operating within the federal bureaucracy (Skowronek et al, 2022).…”