The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950

Recalcitrance and initiative: US hegemony and regional powers in Asia and Europe after World War II

“…But the containment of the People's Republic of China, which included an embargo, meant that only 0.3% of Japan's exports in 1953 went to China. 26 Some hoped that Southeast Asia could take up the slack, and Secretary of State Acheson, describing a 'great crescent' running from Japan through Southeast Asia to the Middle East, encouraged Asian regionalism (Borden, 1984;Hess, 1987;Rotter, 1987;Schaller, 1982Schaller, , 1985Yasuhara, 1986; also see Hoshiro, 2009). Yet, European states that had returned to take control of their former colonies were initially not fully supportive of US policy.…”

Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–45

“…But the Foreign Office felt that if the Americans were determined to remove the French from Indo-China then Britain may not have any choice but to go along with them. 147 Britain required full United States participation in post-war collective security. Britain also needed to avoid the instability of the Dominions siding with the United States.…”

“…In the meantime if the French published Roosevelt's previous pledges on the restoration of the French Empire the results would be 'devastating'. 152 The Foreign Office also remained suspicious of Chinese intentions towards French Indo-China, and it firmly believed that it was both irresponsible and impossible to prevent France from taking part in the war in the Far East. The French had an intimate knowledge of Indo-China, which both Britain and the United States did not, and a substantial number of troops and ships available in North Africa for any such campaign.…”

“…Roosevelt was forced to defend his trusteeship predilection. 147 The President received timely support from Major-General Bill Donovan, Head of the Office for Strategic Services (the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency). Donovan's analysis of Southeast Asia indicated that Britain, France and the Netherlands all intended to re-colonise the region as soon as possible.…”

“…In contrast, Roosevelt expected to be consulted by Britain on all matters relating to Indo-China. 152 In the meantime, Oliver Stanley advised the War Cabinet Armistice and Post-War Committee that Southeast Asia was an ideal candidate for a regional commission. 153 Churchill was vexed with the Committee and his response was draconian.…”