In the seventh chapter of his letter to the Romans, Paul of Tarsus wrote the following words: ξ νοΚ λφσιε ει υο 2ξρσ ποφ ζ τοξ γσ ξοξ. While the apostle Paul may seem an unlikely point of departure for a study of Roman jurisprudence, these nine words, as I hope to demonstrate, provide invaluable information regarding the process by which Roman law was conceptualized and systematized. It is my contention that these words, properly interpreted, yield the first occurrence of the phrase 'law of persons' as well as the first evidence of a general theory of alieni ius, or legal governance by another, in the Western legal tradition. I will begin by examining the evidence from Roman legal literature for the origin of the phrase 'law of persons'. Then I will turn to Paul's statement, offering a new interpretation and providing an account of its connection with Roman law. Finally, I will suggest how this new understanding of Paul contributes to the current scholarly discussion on the extent to which Roman law was organized into conceptual categories in the early classical period. 1 'LAW OF PERSONS' IN ROMAN LAW The phrase 'law of persons' first appears in extant Roman legal sources in Gaius' four-volume Institutes near the middle of the second century A.D. Following a brief preface on the nature of law, and immediately following the famous division of law into persons, things, and actions, Gaius identifies his topic for the remainder of Volume One as ius personarum. 2 While scholars of legal history still debate Gaius' role in the creation of the threefold Institutionensystem, which has so fundamentally shaped legal traditions in the West, there is no particular reason to believe that he coined the phrase ius personarum. In fact, there are several indications he did not. First, Gaius uses ius personarum without any explanation or introductory remark, a sign, perhaps, that his audience was already familiar with the phrase from elsewhere. Second, even though Gaius' presentation is divided into the categories persons, things, and actions, he has no corresponding term for 'law of things' or 'law of actions'. This is particularly noticeable at the beginning of Book 2, where he makes the transition