The Use and Abuse of Veto Rights in Power-Sharing Systems: Northern Ireland’s Petition of Concern in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This article assesses the articulation of vital ethno-national interests and the use and abuse of veto rights in deeply divided societies. In consociational theory, veto rights represent the primary means by which ethnic groups defend their ‘vital interests’, though they are often criticized for rewarding extremism and producing institutional instability. Situating a case study of Northern Ireland in a comparative perspective, I consider two lines of veto practice: liberal vs corporate (i.e. who has veto rights?) and permissive vs restrictive (i.e. to what issue areas do vetoes apply?), to assess what political incentives, if any, they offer for moderation and stability. Drawing from a review of the legislative debates when a veto was enacted and on semi-structured interviews with members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, I argue that a permissive approach, in which groups can determine their own vital interests, can contribute to moderation, peace and stability in divided societies.

The plight of civic parties in divided societies

“…The mutual veto mechanism can also exert an inimical effect, on both civic parties and civic politics more broadly – particularly when adopted in a permissive rather than restrictive form (McCulloch, 2018; McEvoy, 2013), open for use on any, as opposed to certain constitutionally defined, matters. Permissive veto mechanisms have been wielded extensively in BiH, forming a major barrier to legislative progress (Bahtić-Kunrath, 2011).…”

The international mediation of power-sharing settlements

“…Power sharing often entails prolonged periods of coalition-building as well as protracted legislative decision-making. Voluntary interethnic coalitions are difficult to form and vetoes and other delaying tactics have the potential to encumber legislative decision-making (McEvoy, 2013;McCulloch, 2017). External actors respond to the implementation problem with a variety of carrots and sticks, from helping to clarify, streamline or renegotiate aspects of the original deal (i.e., Northern Ireland) to offering new terms of engagement (i.e., EU accession incentives in Macedonia), the re-deployment or strengthening of peacebuilding missions (i.e., Burundi), to directly overruling local actors and imposing new policies (i.e., Bosnia).…”

“…the inability to make or implement policy due to protracted disagreement), frustrations emerge, and one or more parties defect from the accord'. Concession, however, can be dangerous: concede too much and the party risks being labeled as a sell-out, losing voter support as well as their credibility as coalition partners (McCulloch, 2016). Defection, meanwhile, can lead to the resumption of violence.…”

Between Conflict and Peace: An Analysis of the Complex Consequences of the Good Friday Agreement

“…The usage of the veto system has increased rapidly. While 40 petitions of concern were tabled between 1998-2011, the number increased exponentially to 118 in the 2011-2016 legislative session (McCulloch, 2017). Instead of a protective mechanism designed to safeguard the interests of the respective ethnonational communities, the veto has become a 'blocking move' and an abuse of its original intention.…”