The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

Abstract

Despite its seemingly overwhelming military superiority, the Netherlands never came close to defeating the increasingly effective nationalist insurgency on Java in the late 1940s. This article argues that the desperate state of the Dutch counter-insurgency campaign-which tends to be overlooked for the crucial years 1947-1948-is best demonstrated by focussing on the failure of the colonial power to integrate the civilian and military efforts and on its inability to govern reoccupied territory during the 'pacification phase'.

Moral injury in relation to public debates: The role of societal misrecognition in moral conflict-colored trauma among soldiers

“…This discomfort with military violence seems to define the Dutch national self-image: a non-martial, consensus-seeking nation, which finds honor in neutrality and tolerance, and favors peaceful, 'civilized' solutions over violent ones (Zaalberg 2013). Contrasting images of other western nations help reinforce this self-image, of which an important one today is the portrayal of the US as a war-inclined nation (cf.…”

“…Moreover, the Dutch did use forceful tactics (Van der Meulen andSoeters 2005, Zaalberg 2013). Nevertheless, the image exists, and an image is powerful; it shapes public perceptions and as such influences decision-making(Ringsmose and Børgesen 2001, Dimitriu andGraaf 2016).…”

The 3Ds (development, diplomacy, and defense) in Nigerian counterinsurgency: lessons from Uruzgan

“…Despite the merits attributed to the 3Ds approach, some challenges have been observed. For instance, critics such as Zaalberg (2013) contend that the Dutch 3Ds approach was more a construct driven by factors like politics, self-perception, and strategic choices. Regarding it as no more than a "fabrication" for media purposes, Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate (2012, p. 136) argued that "the notion of a "Dutch approach" started to function like a sponge, absorbing various concepts and practices, even if these originated in the same classic COIN theory that the Dutch government had consciously been avoiding as a campaign theme in favor of its strong emphasis on reconstruction."…”

“…From this perspective, the Dutch approach appears to have focused on managing appearances and selectively adopting COIN principles rather than a genuinely comprehensive strategy. Furthermore, the integration of all 3Ds (development, diplomacy, defense) has been infrequent, with a tendency to overemphasize one aspect over an integrated approach (Zaalberg, 2013). Besides, evaluating the longterm transferability and effectiveness of the 3Ds approach remains challenging due to its limited application primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq.…”