The Use of a Game Theory Model to Explore the Emergence of Core/Periphery Structure in Networks and Its Symmetry

Abstract

In network systems characterized by complex interactions of various types, core-periphery structures can be found. In this paper, we deal with such questions as what processes can lead to the emergence of core-periphery formation, whether this structure is symmetric, and to what extent. Namely, the question of symmetry in a complex network is still the subject of intense research interest. Symmetry can relate to network topology, network relationships, and other processes on networks. To answer these questions, we modified the model of the classic social dilemma called the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (or repeated PD game) by adding the cost of maintaining relationships between the pairs of players (partners) and especially by adding the possibility of ending some relationships. We present the results of simulations that suggest that the players’ network strategy (i.e., partner selection or termination of relationships with some partners) is the driving force behind the emergence of a core-periphery structure in networks rather than the player’s strategy in PD. Our results also suggest that the formed core is symmetric, and this symmetry is a result of the symmetric interactions of core players. Our outcomes can help understand various economic or social questions related to creating centers or peripheries, including their symmetry in different network systems.