The use of intelligence by insurgent groups: the North Vietnamese in the Second Indochina War as a case study

Abstract

The need to define intelligence, as a product and an activity, is understandable because the secrecy surrounding it can almost make it appear too amorphous to study. In most definitions, the authors not only attempt to define that intelligence is but also who does it. Until very recently the focus has been on the state as the principle focus of study, with occasional focus on sub-state actors such as law enforcement agencies. After 9/11 in particular there was a shift from the study of inter-state intelligence to the use of intelligence against non-state actors such as Al Qaeda. The literature still treated these non-state actors as something to be acted upon rather than intelligence actors in their own right. By examining the North Vietnamese use of intelligence during the Second Indochina War, albeit as a hybrid state/non-state actor, this article will take a small step to redress that oversight. This article will discuss the North Vietnamese use of intelligence in the context of definitions of intelligence and intelligence actors, and will use John Gentry's proposed model of violent non-state actor intelligence as the analytical framework.