The Usefulness of Social Norm Theory in Empirical Business Ethics Research: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research

Blay, Allen D.; Gooden, Eric S.; Mellon, Mark J.; Stevens, Douglas E.

doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3286-4

Cited by 81 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…This result is consistent with the proposition that employees operating under fixed pay are more receptive to the social belongingness promoted by a value statement, a behavior consistent with normative expectations being activated by social norms (Bicchieri 2006;Blay, Gooden, Mellon and Stevens 2018;Akinyele et al 2020). This result extends the findings from Kachelmeier et al (2016) and Akinyele et al (2020) by showing additional benefits of a value statement as an informal management control in multitask settings (Hecht et al 2012), while also highlighting the less desirable performance outcomes exuding from mixing piece-rate incentives with a value statement promoting social belongingness (Akinyele et al 2020).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Motivating Unrewarded Task Performance: The Dual Effects of Incentives and an Organizational Value Statement in a Multitask Setting

Akinyele¹

2020

Preprint

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Management control systems research increasingly recognizes the interactive effects of packages of controls. These interactive effects may be exacerbated in multitask settings consisting of both rewarded and unrewarded tasks. Organizational value statements are informal controls shown to alter the relationship between compensation schemes and performance. This study's purpose is to examine these value statement effects in a multitask environment consisting of both rewarded and unrewarded tasks. Results show that under fixed pay compensation, the presence of a value statement motivates performance on important but unrewarded tasks. Conversely, under piecerate incentive compensation, value statements negatively influence performance on unrewarded tasks. This study contributes to the management control literature by establishing how and when informal management control systems can improve employees' unrewarded task performance. In contemporary work environments where such multitask arrangements are common, the results suggest informal controls may be preferable to formal controls focused on incentive compensation.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 89%

Motivating Unrewarded Task Performance: The Dual Effects of Incentives and an Organizational Value Statement in a Multitask Setting

Akinyele¹

2020

Preprint

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“…If, on the other hand, a subordinate observes that the peer intends to create a high amount of budgetary slack, then this empirical expectation is at odds with the normative expectation. In this situation, theory suggests the focal subordinate's reporting behavior will be influenced to a lesser degree by the amount of budgetary slack the peer intends to create (Blay et al ). Overall, we expect that in the presence of peer observability, subordinates in the low vertical pay dispersion condition will, on average, align their reporting decisions with peer reports that contain lower slack rather than with those that contain higher slack .…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, subordinates are likely to perceive high vertical pay dispersion as unfair (Martin 1981(Martin , 1982(Martin , 1986, reducing their work motivation and increasing the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors. Bicchieri (2006) argues that social norms are context-dependent and contingently activated, and the activation of social norms is often subconscious (see also Biel and Thogersen 2007; for a review of applications of Bicchieri's model in business ethics research, see Blay et al 2018). In other words, individuals have conditional preferences for conforming to social norms.…”

Section: Vertical Pay Dispersionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical Pay Dispersion, Peer Observability, and Misreporting in a Participative Budgeting Setting

Guo

Libby

Liu

et al. 2019

Contemporary Accting Res

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In this study, we examine the joint effect of vertical pay dispersion and peer observability on subordinates' misreporting choices. We adopt a participative budgeting setting in which two subordinates report to one superior, and we manipulate vertical pay dispersion (low/high) and peer observability (absent/present). Subordinates have private information about actual project costs and can over‐report project costs to the superior without detection and thus create budgetary slack. When a peer's reporting choices are observable, we predict and find that peer reporting choices have an asymmetric influence on the focal subordinates' reporting choices, and this asymmetric influence depends on the level of vertical pay dispersion. Specifically, we find that when vertical pay dispersion is low, subordinates who observe peer reports containing low slack misreport less, whereas observing peer reports that contain high slack has no significant effect. However, when vertical pay dispersion is high, subordinates who observe peer reports containing high slack misreport more, whereas observing peer reports that contain low slack has no significant effect. Driven by these asymmetric effects, subordinates misreport less in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is low and misreport more in the presence of peer observability than in its absence when vertical pay dispersion is high. Overall, our findings suggest that when a firm has a more egalitarian pay structure (i.e., low vertical pay dispersion), an open information policy is conducive to a more honest reporting environment, whereas under a more hierarchical pay structure (i.e., high vertical pay dispersion), open information policies can compromise the honesty of subordinates' reports.

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“…As summarized in Blay et al (2015) the roots of social norm theory can be traced back to Adam Smith's (1759/1790) influential work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith asserted that mankind is gifted with a natural reverence for the general rules of conduct.…”

Section: Social Norm Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Smith asserted that mankind is gifted with a natural reverence for the general rules of conduct. This natural respect for social norms can be observed in the substantial role that norms and laws play in sustaining order throughout society (Smith 1759(Smith /1790Blay et al 2015). Bicchieri's (2006) model of social norm activation explains how people interpret the motives and expectations of others.…”

Section: Social Norm Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity Under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study

Smith¹

2018

SSRN Journal

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Managers have often used tournament incentive programs because of their ability to attract top talent and motivate employees to give their best effort (Grote 2005; McGregor 2006; Ng and Lublin 2010). However, because a tournament incentive structure explicitly evokes competition, prior economic literature has shown that the harmful effects of sabotage observed during a tournament can completely negate any benefits they have (Carpenter et al. 2010). The remedies suggested to reduce sabotage involve reducing the economic incentives that contribute to both beneficial and harmful behavior (Chen 2003). In the accounting literature to date, no remedy for the harmful effects of a tournament incentive has been investigated because the ability to sabotage has been restricted by way of tight experimental control. I utilize an experiment in which participants perform a real effort task which allows them to sabotage each other and receive relative performance feedback in real-time. I first predict that sabotage during a tournament will be higher than fixed pay because of the higher incentive to sabotage during a tournament. I then predict that by employing a code of ethics, I can activate the social norm of promise keeping which discourages those in a tournament from engaging in sabotage, while still giving their best effort. In the majority of cases, this allows the company to reap the previously observed benefits of a tournament incentive, while minimizing the previously observed costs that normally accompany a tournament incentive. However, I unexpectedly discover that a code of ethics can be able double-edge sword; In so much that, if violations persist despite certifications to follow the code, participants may become more discouraged and their behavior more detrimentally effects productivity than if those same violations occurred without a code. The implications of employing a code of ethics under these two incentive systems on overall productivity is explored.

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The Usefulness of Social Norm Theory in Empirical Business Ethics Research: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research

Cited by 81 publications

References 39 publications

Motivating Unrewarded Task Performance: The Dual Effects of Incentives and an Organizational Value Statement in a Multitask Setting

Motivating Unrewarded Task Performance: The Dual Effects of Incentives and an Organizational Value Statement in a Multitask Setting

Vertical Pay Dispersion, Peer Observability, and Misreporting in a Participative Budgeting Setting

Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity Under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study

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