1998
DOI: 10.2307/2491320
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The Value of Auditor Assurance: Evidence from Loan Pricing

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Cited by 371 publications
(238 citation statements)
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“…We also include return on assets (ROA) and the ratio of total debts to total assets (LEV) as control variables because previous research suggests they may affect discretionary accrual choices in the current period. Finally, given that increased credibility of audited information has been shown to result in the lower cost of capital (Yu, 2005, refers to a transparency spread in bond markets) for firms that receive clean opinions (Bamber and Stratton, 1997;Blackwell et al, 1998), we use the ratio of total bank debts to interest expenses. We expect that bankers, as senior debt claimants, can serve as a third party certification of the firm and provide a monitoring function as senior debt holders.…”
Section: Methodology and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We also include return on assets (ROA) and the ratio of total debts to total assets (LEV) as control variables because previous research suggests they may affect discretionary accrual choices in the current period. Finally, given that increased credibility of audited information has been shown to result in the lower cost of capital (Yu, 2005, refers to a transparency spread in bond markets) for firms that receive clean opinions (Bamber and Stratton, 1997;Blackwell et al, 1998), we use the ratio of total bank debts to interest expenses. We expect that bankers, as senior debt claimants, can serve as a third party certification of the firm and provide a monitoring function as senior debt holders.…”
Section: Methodology and Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Blackwell, Noland, and Winters [1998] find auditor use associated with lower interest rates in 212 revolving credit agreements from six US banks. Allee and Yohn [2010], using a representative sample of 1,481 US private firms, finds no association between audit association and cost of debt.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…Voluntary audits facilitate debt contracting for two reasons. First, they may alleviate information uncertainty faced by lenders; second, the assurance provided by an audit may reduce debt monitoring and negotiation costs (Blackwell, Noland, & Winters, 1998;Kim et al, 2011). Empirical research from Korea, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA supports these arguments (Blackwell, Noland, & Winters, 1998;Minnis, 2011;Kim et al, 2011;Lennox & Pittman, 2011;Dedman & Kausar, 2012;Kausar, Shro , & White, 2016).…”
Section: The Demand Side: Do Private Smes Demand Audit?mentioning
confidence: 99%