The value of coordinated management of interacting ecosystem services

Abstract

Coordinating decisions and actions among interacting sectors is a critical component of ecosystem-based management, but uncertainty about coordinated management's effects is compromising its perceived value and use. We constructed an analytical framework for explicitly calculating how coordination affects management decisions, ecosystem state and the provision of ecosystem services in relation to ecosystem dynamics and socio-economic objectives. The central insight is that the appropriate comparison strategy to optimal coordinated management is optimal uncoordinated management, which can be identified at the game theoretic Nash equilibrium. Using this insight we can calculate coordination's effects in relation to uncoordinated management and other reference scenarios. To illustrate how this framework can help identify ecosystem and socio-economic conditions under which coordination is most influential and valuable, we applied it to a heuristic case study and a simulation model for the California Current Marine Ecosystem. Results indicate that coordinated management can more than double an ecosystem's societal value, especially when sectors can effectively manipulate resources that interact strongly. However, societal gains from coordination will need to be reconciled with observations that it also leads to strategic simplification of the ecological food web, and generates both positive and negative impacts on individual sectors and non-target species.

Achieving the triple bottom line in the face of inherent trade-offs among social equity, economic return, and conservation

“…This tension among values sits at the heart of perceived and real trade-offs among conservation objectives, total economic gains (or losses), and social equity. To date, the issue of equity has largely been addressed indirectly, through implicit assumptions about spreading costs or benefits, or as a secondary concern, as with post hoc comparisons of the equity of outcomes (36). We have shown here that explicit assessment of how equity influences the ability to achieve conservation outcomes produces a more nuanced and realistic picture of the effects of any given conservation objective on different groups, and may indicate under what conditions significant trade-offs are likely to occur.…”

“…Highly inequitable solutions are more likely to fail because those who are disenfranchised from the benefits or outcomes of the process often feel little motivation to adhere to the agreement (15). Increases in equity are typically believed to improve the probability of success by increasing likelihood of self-enforcement of new regulations because people perceive the regulations as fair (36,37), yet it is equally likely that management will fail if the needs or desires of particularly vocal or powerful minorities are not met. Most of these assumptions remain untested.…”

The manager dilemma: Optimal management of an ecosystem service in heterogeneous exploited landscapes

“…As a result, trade-offs may emerge between the different ecosystem services, that have to be managed simultaneously (Loeuille et al, 2013). Such optimal management of multiple ecosystem services can significantly improve the utility provided to human beings, especially if the species involved strongly interact (White et al, 2012). They also significantly complexify the optimization approach compared to the relatively simple scenarios we show here.…”

Biological interactions and cooperative management of multiple species

“…If focusing on a single resource or treating whole ecosystems as inseparable units, ecosystem management is often modeled as a typical public goods game [2–4], and the natural attributes of an ecosystem are often overlooked or proven to be secondary if they do not take into account technical factors [5–7]. However, for the management of interacting resources, this hypothesis is questionable [8]. …”