2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.04.004
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The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence from US cross-listings

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Cited by 269 publications
(218 citation statements)
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“…This literature recognizes the importance of corporate governance and financial reporting information in mitigating the value destruction associated with cash holdings (e.g. Chen, Harford, & Lin, 2015;Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007;Frésard & Salva, 2010;Louis et al, 2012;Masulis et al, 2009). We extend this understanding of mitigating influences by revealing that non-financial disclosures also help mitigate the value destruction associated with cash holdings.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 80%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This literature recognizes the importance of corporate governance and financial reporting information in mitigating the value destruction associated with cash holdings (e.g. Chen, Harford, & Lin, 2015;Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007;Frésard & Salva, 2010;Louis et al, 2012;Masulis et al, 2009). We extend this understanding of mitigating influences by revealing that non-financial disclosures also help mitigate the value destruction associated with cash holdings.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…Recent studies find that investors value a firm's cash holdings at a sizable discount (e.g. Arena & Julio, 2015;Faulkender & Wang, 2006;Frésard & Salva, 2010;Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009) and suggest that high-quality financial disclosure can facilitate monitoring to mitigate the value destruction associated with cash holdings (e.g. Drobetz, Grüninger, & Hirchvogl, 2010;Louis, Sun, & Urcan, 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Doidge et al (2004) report Tobin's q ratios 16.5 per cent higher in firms that cross-list on a US stock exchange relative to matched non-cross-listed firms from the same country. Pinkowitz et al (2006) and Fre´sard and Salva (2009) provide evidence that cross-listing on a US exchange raises the valuation of cash holdings and that the premium in the value of cash enjoyed is sustained in the long run. The valuation effects are strongest for firms from countries with weak legal protection of shareholder rights, with one dollar of cash worth approximately the same amount in higher shareholder protection countries with highly developed financial markets but less than 65 cents in low protection countries where there is more risk (Pinkowitz et al, 2006).…”
Section: Firm Performance and Legal Protectionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is only when there is strong legal protection for shareholders that corporate governance has no impact on the value of cash holdings. Fresard and Salva (2010) adopt a slightly different approach by examining the impact of cross-listing on US exchanges on the value of cash of non-US firms. The legal protection for investors in the US provides a stronger system of corporate governance in the US than in firms' domestic countries.…”
Section: Cross-country Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%