The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets

Richter, Jan; Viehmann, Johannes

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.03.023

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In contrast, one of the main application aspects of the dynamic Bayesian game with incomplete information is signaling game [153], such as enterprise investment game and employment market signal game [43]. In terms of power DR in the EM, Bayesian game theory has been preliminarily applied by scholars in following aspects: DRM, real-time DR and energy trading in the smart grid or microgrid [52], [110], [154]- [157], bidding strategy formulation of generation companies [133], [146], [158]- [163], incentive mechanism in electricity auction market [153], [164], [165], contract negotiation [166], [167], electric power bidding under uncertain demand [168]. For this reason, we separately choose Bayesian game from the noncooperative game theory and conduct a survey on its application in the EM from the perspective of power DR among electricity supplier side (e.g., power generation companies), electricity seller side (e.g., power grid companies, power sales companies, load aggregator), and electricity user side (e.g., small and medium users, large users, distributed new energy users) in this section.…”

Section: Bayesian Game-theoretic Approach and Its Applications Imentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such GSM bidding mechanism can effectively decrease the clearing price, increase the total transaction volume, decrease the profits of electricity generators, and increase the overall benefits of purchasers. In addition, researchers in [164] and [165] both use the Bayesian game theory to investigate the incentive mechanisms in the auction market. For example, Yue et al [165] apply the method of Bayesian game to analyze the pricing method in electricity distribution market, which indicates that the recommended method is not only a valid method for EM extension, but also has important reference value for electricity distribution pricing.…”

Section: ) Power Dr Between Electricity User Side and Electricity Sumentioning

confidence: 99%

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Game-Theoretic Approaches Applied to Transactions in the Open and Ever-Growing Electricity Markets From the Perspective of Power Demand Response: An Overview

Cheng

2019

IEEE Access

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This paper conducts a detailed overview on game-theoretic approaches for power demand response (DR) in the open and ever-growing electricity market (EM) in terms of three major categories of games, including non-cooperative game, cooperative game, and evolutionary game. In addition, we also separately review the Stackelberg game and Bayesian game in power DR. First, we briefly describe the main contents of game theory and the game behaviors of the electricity sellers, electricity suppliers, and electricity users in EM. Second, we comprehensively introduce the principle of the above-mentioned five categories of games and thoroughly review their applications in power DR in the context of open EMs, considering the transactions such as electricity pricing and electricity capacity trading among the electricity supplier side, electricity seller side, and electricity user side in the perfect open EMs, such as retail market, spot market, wholesale market, and ancillary service market. In this survey, aiming at each type of game mentioned above, we try to summarize the advantages and shortcomings of their application in EM in terms of power DR, as well as the issues that need to be solved currently or in the future. Finally, we offer some prospects on the scenario application and future development of game-theoretic approaches for power DR in an open EM. The biggest innovation of this paper lies in conducting a comprehensive survey on game-theoretic approaches applied to transactions in the open and ever-growing EMs from the perspective of power DR in terms of five major categories of games. We conduct this survey intended to arouse the interest and excitement of experts and scholars in the energy and electric power system industry and to look ahead to efforts that jointly promote the rapid development of game theory in the perfect open EM field.

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Section: Bayesian Game-theoretic Approach and Its Applications Imentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ) Power Dr Between Electricity User Side and Electricity Sumentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-Theoretic Approaches Applied to Transactions in the Open and Ever-Growing Electricity Markets From the Perspective of Power Demand Response: An Overview

Cheng

2019

IEEE Access

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“…Because traditional optimization theory is not appropriate for multiagent behavior decisions, researchers have proposed bidding game models such as the Cournot model [5], master-slave game model [6], and supply function model [7]. For example, the authors in [8] analyzed the effect of capacity limitations on the behavior of power generation enterprises by using the Cournot model. Reference [9] proposed two Stackelberg master-slave models to determine the bidding strategies of e-commerce platforms and advertisers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of stochastic mutation in the evolution of bidding behavior for power generation enterprises

Mo¹,

Ren²,

Ye³

2023

Preprint

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<p>In the bidding process in the power generation market, enterprises often exhibit speculative behaviors due to the loopholes in bidding rules. To explore the evolution of power generation enterprises from a benign bidding state to a speculative bidding state, an evolutionary game model is established. Based on the replicator dynamics equation, an evolutionary game model of a power generation market containing multiple power generation enterprise groups with different bidding strategies is constructed by introducing the relationship factors of the strategies. Then, to analyze the internal mechanism of the outbreak of speculative behavior, the replicator dynamics equation is transformed into a classical sharp point mutation model. On this basis, Gaussian white noise is introduced to construct the stochastic catastrophe model. The influence of the random disturbance term on the stability of the bidding behavior of enterprises is discussed from the perspective of the trajectory difference between the analytical solution and the numerical solution of the stochastic differential equation. The results show that the final decision state of the group strategy and the convergence time of group evolution to this state depend on the value of the strategy relationship factor. The emergence of random disturbances will lead to heterogeneous decision-making actions within the group. That is, the evolution of the group will fluctuate near the strategic equilibrium point. The difference between the analytical solution and the numerical solution of the stochastic catastrophe model can increase the possibility of a sudden change in the bidding strategy state and thereby decrease the stability of the bidding behavior.</p>

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“…In ref. [4], the Cournot game model was used to study the bidding behavior of power-generating companies with capacity limitations. In ref.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

MRL-Based Model for Diverse Bidding Decision-Makings of Power Retail Company in the Wholesale Electricity Market of China

Wang

Liu

Yuan

et al. 2023

Axioms

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Power retail companies in the electricity market make profits through buying and selling power energy in the wholesale and retail markets, respectively. Traditionally, they are assumed to bid in the wholesale market with the same objective, i.e., maximize the profit. This paper proposes a multiagent reinforcement learning (MRL)-based model to simulate the diverse bidding decision-making concerning various operation objectives and the profit-sharing modes of power retail companies in China’s wholesale electricity market, which contributes to a more realistic modeling and simulation of the retail companies. Specifically, three types of operation objectives and five types of profit-sharing modes are mathematically formulated. After that, a complete electricity market optimization model is established, and a case study with 30 retail companies is carried out. The simulation results show that the proposed method can effectively model the diverse bidding decision-making of the power retail companies, which can further assist their decision-making and further contribute to the analysis and simulations of the electricity market.

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The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets

Cited by 8 publications

References 15 publications

Game-Theoretic Approaches Applied to Transactions in the Open and Ever-Growing Electricity Markets From the Perspective of Power Demand Response: An Overview

Game-Theoretic Approaches Applied to Transactions in the Open and Ever-Growing Electricity Markets From the Perspective of Power Demand Response: An Overview

Analysis of stochastic mutation in the evolution of bidding behavior for power generation enterprises

MRL-Based Model for Diverse Bidding Decision-Makings of Power Retail Company in the Wholesale Electricity Market of China

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