The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress

Arruda, Caroline T.

doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9738-1

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…5). For alternative ways in which desires might 'improve' which are compatible with a procedural view of rationality, seeArruda (2017). For criticism of Markovits and Smith, seeSobel (2016) andBukoski (2016), respectively.…”

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confidence: 99%

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Strandberg¹

2018

Dialectica

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A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.

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confidence: 99%

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Strandberg¹

2018

Dialectica

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“… 3 Other aspects of moral status are subject to debate—such as whether it is grounded in intrinsic features of the individual (Delon 2014; McMahan 2005), whether personhood or merely the capacity for agency can ground it (Arruda unpublished manuscript; Korsgaard 1996; 2009; Martin 2006; McMahan 2005; Liao 2010; Sebo 2017; Regan 2004; but compare with Warren 1997), what role potentiality plays (Harman 2003), whether it comes in degrees (DeGrazia 2008), among others. None of what I say here depends on settling these debates.…”

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“… 10 I pursue the question of whether moral status is exclusively a first-order moral matter in Arruda (unpublished manuscript). …”

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Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics

Arruda

2018

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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I show that an overlooked feature of our moral life—moral status—provides a route to vindicating naturalist moral realism in much the same way that the Humean theory of motivation and judgment internalism are used to undermine it. Moral status presents two explanatory burdens for metaethical views. First, a given view must provide an ecumenical explanation of moral status, which does not depend on the truth of its metaethical claims (say, that there are mind-independent facts about moral status). Second, its explanation must be consistent with persistent normative ethical disagreement about what constitutes moral status. I conclude that naturalist moral realism succeeds, while quasi-realism fails because it cannot meet the latter requirement. This argument has three results: we have a new route for metaethical vindication more generally and for naturalist moral realism in particular; quasi-realism's plausibility is undermined by an inability to explain disagreement, but not for the familiar reasons.

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Butchering Benevolence Moral Progress beyond the Expanding Circle

Sauer

2019

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Standard evolutionary explanations seem unable to account for inclusivist shifts that expand the circle of moral concern beyond strategically relevant cooperators. Recently, Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have argued that this shows that that evolutionary conservatismthe view that our inherited psychology imposes significant feasibility constraints on how much inclusivist moral progress can be achievedis unjustified. Secondly, they hold that inclusivist gains can be sustained, and exclusivist tendencies curbed, under certain favorable socio-economic conditions. I argue that Buchanan and Powell concede too much to the evolutionary conservative, because their second point shows that conservatives are right about the first: inclusivist shifts are unrealistic where it matters most, namely under harsh social, political and economic conditions. I suggest two promising strategies for solving this problem. One is to focus on different forms of moral progress to secure the same moral gains. The other is to look beyond possible extensions of our psychological capacities altogether, by providing institutional support that renders them irrelevant. We should bypass, rather than further stretch, the constraints of our evolved psychology to make moral progress possible.

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The Varieties of Moral Improvement, or why Metaethical Constructivism must Explain Moral Progress

Cited by 7 publications

References 42 publications

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons

Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics

Butchering Benevolence Moral Progress beyond the Expanding Circle

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