The Virtue of Care

Steyl, Steven

doi:10.1111/hypa.12481

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…6 Most often, when we describe some action as being 'caring', there is a positive valence associated with it. To care is considered to be a good thing, and when we say of someone that they are 'caring', we mean this oftentimes as a positive, valuable trait-even a virtue (Slote 2001(Slote , 2007Halwani 2003;Steyl 2019). A relationship in which both people help meet the needs of another is considered to be an example of a good relationship, as much as it is an example of a caring one.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Chadha-Sridhar

2023

Res Publica

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Philosophers who study care—most often, care ethicists—are involved in an ongoing discussion about the concept of care. Despite the significant progress made in this discussion, certain conflicting images of care seem to persist in the literature. On one hand, as feminist theorists across disciplines have highlighted, care is a complex social practice that is mired in inequality and injustice. The deeply gendered nature of caring and the unequal division of care-work creates and cements structural inequalities. On the other hand, care is also thought of as a moral value or an ideal. The ethics of care—a moral theory with decidedly feminist roots—is predicated on the idea that caring is somehow morally valuable. A discrepancy thus arises: care is a social practice that compounds injustices. But it is also a moral value. What is it about care that makes it malleable to such variations? To pick out this complexity and capture the conceptual nuances at play, this paper suggests that we frame the concept of care as a thick ethical concept. I will first demonstrate why this framing is helpful. Then, I will provide accounts of the descriptive and evaluative elements of the concept of care. I hope to show that it is through a thick conceptual framing that we can make sense of care—both as a complex social practice and an important moral value in the worlds that we inhabit.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Chadha-Sridhar

2023

Res Publica

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“…Feminist ethicists assume that one's context influences what one chooses to study, who is left out and who is included in studies, who conducts the research, and who interprets it. And they work, to the extent possible, to include in their scholarly work attentiveness, responsiveness, empathy, sociality, and other responses that are often cited by care ethicists as virtues (Steyl, 2019).…”

Section: Theme #2: Attentiveness and Subjective Knowledge Can Illuminate Moral Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Open Science and Feminist Ethics: Promises and Challenges of Open Access

Brabeck

2021

Psychology of Women Quarterly

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Open science advocates argue that making data sets, studies, methodologies, and other aspects of research free from publication fees and available to scholars will increase collaborations, access, and dissemination of knowledge. In this article, I argue that open access policies and practices raise both feminist and ethical issues. I reflect on the five themes of feminist ethics identified 20 years ago by a task force of the Society for the Psychology of Women. I update the themes with recent scholarship of feminist philosophers and ethicists, and I use the themes to raise questions about the promises and challenges of open access. Throughout, I offer suggestions for all who seek to make knowledge of human psychology more complete and more accessible to more people. I conclude by offering recommendations informed by feminist ethics to those building the policies and practices of open access.

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“…2002b ;Hamington 2004;Held 2006;Noddings 2010;, virtue ethics' conservatism (Held 2006;Pettersen 2011;Groenhout 2014), and the nonidentity of the two ethics' primary moral currency (Held 2006). As I point out elsewhere (Steyl 2019), greater clarity on what exactly care consists in will help combat these misunderstandings. Care is widely regarded as a virtue, but it is also slotted into a variety of other conceptual categories, and deeper incursions into those other categories enable care ethicists to differentiate care from virtue ethicists' central moral concepts: virtues and dispositions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Care ethicists have often lamented the frequency with which they are mislabeled as virtue ethicists (see, for example, Groenhout 1998), insisting that the two normative frameworks are different for a plethora of reasons, including virtue ethics’ individualism (Noddings 2002b; Hamington 2004; Held 2006; Noddings 2010; 2015), virtue ethics’ conservatism (Held 2006; Pettersen 2011; Groenhout 2014), and the nonidentity of the two ethics’ primary moral currency (Held 2006). As I point out elsewhere (Steyl 2019), greater clarity on what exactly care consists in will help combat these misunderstandings. Care is widely regarded as a virtue, but it is also slotted into a variety of other conceptual categories, and deeper incursions into those other categories enable care ethicists to differentiate care from virtue ethicists’ central moral concepts: virtues and dispositions 1 .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Caring Actions

Steyl

2020

Hypatia

Self Cite

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Though the literature on care ethics has mushroomed in recent years, much remains to be said about several important topics therein. One of these is action. In this article, I draw on Anscombean philosophy of action to develop a kind of meta- or proto-ethical theory of caring actions. I begin by showing how the fragmentary philosophy of action offered by care ethicists meshes with Elizabeth Anscombe's broader philosophy of action, and argue that Anscombe's philosophy of action offers a useful scaffold for a theory of caring actions. Following this, I defend an account of caring actions as those that aim to meet needs. I argue that care aims at satisfying eudaimonistic needs, those things without which one cannot flourish. I then consider the place of caring actions in care ethics. I suggest that if caring actions are to be a starting point for an ethical theory, we ought to reject the notion that a caring action must bring about its intended consequences, and I show how the concept of practice better equips us to evaluate caring actions.

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The Virtue of Care

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Care as a Thick Ethical Concept

Open Science and Feminist Ethics: Promises and Challenges of Open Access

Caring Actions

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