The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic realignment fuelling their electoral success

Abstract

Abstract. The two occupational groups most likely to vote for populist right parties in Western Europe in the 1990s also disagree the most over issues relating to the economic dimension of politics. The two groups were: blue‐collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention. Proponents of economic realignment theories have held that both groups voted for the populist right because their economic preferences became aligned in recent decades. This article analyzes more detailed comparative data than has previously been available in the two cases held to be most propitious for the realignment hypotheses – France and Denmark – and finds strong evidence against them. The key mechanism for bringing together voters who disagree on state intervention in the economy is the populist right's appeal on issues cross‐cutting the economic dimension, and these voters’ willingness to grant such issues pre‐eminence over economic ones. As a result, it is argued, populist right parties in Western Europe are limited by or vulnerable to the salience of the economic dimension.

Towards the median economic crisis voter? The new leftist economic agenda of the Front National in France

“…Rovny (2013) claims that those parties tend to deliberately 'blur' their positions on economic issues to attract broader electoral support. These parties present antagonistic economic positions and their voters hold significantly more dispersed economic views (Ivarsflaten, 2005). There might also be some variation in their positions across policy sub-areas -i.e.…”

The Paradox of Well-being: Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among the Less Well-Off?

“…First, they could support them because they agree with these parties' main ideological messages. It has been shown that when it comes to radical right voting, the effect of someone's socioeconomic position is strongly a function of, or mediated by, attitudes toward immigration (see Ivarsflaten, 2008;Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, & Bornschier, 2008;Kriesi et al, 2006;Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000, 2005. In particular, those who experience economic difficulties are likely to have anti-immigration attitudes and in turn, and therefore, vote for a radical right party.…”

“…In addition to these particular mediating attitudes, others might matter as well. For instance, recent research has shown that when it comes to both radical right and radical left voting, general left-right attitudes and attitudes toward European integration are important mediators (see Ivarsflaten, 2005;Ramiro, 2016;Van der Brug et al, 2000;Werts et al, 2013).…”

Nationalistic attitudes and voting for the radical right in Europe

“…First, researchers studied the role of attitudes towards migrants and integration (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005Ivarsflaten, , 2008Norris, 2005;Rydgren, 2008;Van der Brug et al, 2000) and second, studies turned to the role of euro-scepticism (e.g. Werts et al 2012).…”