2018
DOI: 10.17323/1726-3247-2018-2-50-85
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The Wages of Destruction The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (an excerpt)

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Cited by 9 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…143 Had the Third Reich been fully in control of reform efforts in 1934, there could have well been a nationalization of the entire banking system. 144 Instead, for one official, the political shifts provided the Reichsbank with an opportunity to justify its control over domestic credit: "In the National Socialist state, . .…”
Section: Interventions and Reformmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…143 Had the Third Reich been fully in control of reform efforts in 1934, there could have well been a nationalization of the entire banking system. 144 Instead, for one official, the political shifts provided the Reichsbank with an opportunity to justify its control over domestic credit: "In the National Socialist state, . .…”
Section: Interventions and Reformmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consequently, the Indian rupee depreciated relative to the Reichsmark, making German exports less profitable. The German government, in desperate need of foreign currency exchange, expanded its export subsidies and increased state control of imports and exports (Tooze, , pp. 71–86).…”
Section: German Mnes In Interwar Indiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The historian Adam Tooze (2007) has rewritten the economic history of the Second World War, to emphasize that German strategy, including the genocide, was substantially driven by a lust for land; without lebensraum and the agricultural terrain it would bring into German hands the Nazi leadership believed that Germany would be permanently reduced to the status of a second-rate power. For Germany, therefore, the hedge behavior compatible with sustained peace was never an option.…”
Section: Minsky and Modern Historymentioning
confidence: 99%