The War Power and Its Limits

Kassop, Nancy

doi:10.1111/1741-5705.00004

Cited by 29 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Kassop, 2003). In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US military invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, which quickly reframed the situation, portraying the United States as an avenger rather than a defenceless victim.…”

Section: Regulatory Overreactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy overreaction

Maor

2012

J. Pub. Pol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The literature on policy success and failure does not capture policies that may be too successful, as well as ''too much'' and/or ''too soon'' patterns of policy. To bridge this gap, this conceptual article relies on one of the most robust findings in the psychology of judgement, namely that many people are overconfident, prone to place too much faith in their intuitions. Based on this premise, the analytical framework advanced here revolves around two key dimensions of policy overreaction: (i) the effects of positive and negative events, and (ii) the effects of overestimation and accurate estimation of information. Based on these dimensions, the article identifies and illustrates four distinct modes of policy overreaction that reflect differences in the nature of implemented policy. It argues that the policy tools menu utilised in each mode of policy overreaction is dominated by unique mechanisms for changing or coordinating behaviour, which, once established, produce excessive -objective and/or perceived -social costs.

show abstract

Section: Regulatory Overreactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy overreaction

Maor

2012

J. Pub. Pol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Fatovic 2004a;Baker 2003;Fisher 2003: Elsea 2003Kassop 2003;Lindsay 2003;Baker 2002. This compels presidents to justify their actions to the people, thus alerting the people to the dangers of executive prerogative.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While showing the need for executive prerogative, he also shows its dangers to the very constitution it is meant to preserve. 36 See Kassop 2003;Baker 2003;Elsea 2003;Fisher 2003. It is often thought to be an executive subordinate to the constitution.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lincoln's Example: Executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism

Kleinerman¹

2005

PPS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the wake of the Bush administration's use of executive power since 9/11, Abraham Lincoln's executive actions during the Civil War have received more attention than usual. Typically associated with the idea that constitutions should recede in favor of the rule of one during crisis situations, Lincoln's actions have been used on one side as the implicit and even explicit basis of presidential claims to increased power and on the other side as the example par excellence of what presidents should not do. Taking issue with this conventional interpretation and continuing the more recent scholarly recovery of Lincoln's profound concern for constitutionalism, I explicate the principles that guided Lincoln's use of executive power during the Civil War. By drawing out the importance of political necessity as the basis for "prerogative" over and against both popular approval and unlimited constitutional powers, I show how this principle also provides an alternative perspective and even an antidote to the current scholarly debate concerning whether constitutions are better preserved by "Jeffersonian" or "Hamiltonian" prerogative. Lincoln's example also shows us that we should not legalize, regularize, or institutionalize those powers that may be necessary to avert a crisis. Perhaps most importantly, Lincoln's statesmanship teaches us that constitutions can moderate and limit discretionary executive power only if the people learn an attachment to their Constitution that does not come naturally to them.

show abstract

“…We are also reminded that congressional war powers are enumerated in the Constitution and the framers’ intentions for prior congressional authorization are clear, except in cases of emergency defensive actions (Edelson and Starr‐Deeken ; Fisher ). Yet, the Bush and Obama presidencies defend versions of a “unitary executive theory” of war that largely rejects outside institutional meddling (Posner and Vermeule ; Yoo ), provoking repeated criticism (Edelson ; Kassop ; Pfiffner ; Pious ). The contemporary House and Senate are also getting renewed attention, with some studies highlighting their formal and informal influence prior to presidential war decisions (Howell and Pevehouse ; Kriner ) and afterward in the oversight process (Kriner ).…”

Section: War Is a Three‐branch Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contemporary Presidency: Judicial Restraint and the New War Powers

Farrier

2016

Pres Stud Q

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Over the past four decades, members of Congress have filed 10 lawsuits challenging military actions abroad that were ordered or sustained by presidents without prior legislative consent. In dismissing these cases, federal courts told the plaintiffs to use their legislative tools to show disapproval of the actions already in progress. Under this logic, the House and Senate must have a veto‐proof supermajority to end an existing military engagement before a case can be heard on the merits. These precedents contrast with previous war powers cases initiated by private litigants, which focused on prior simple majority legislative authority for presidential action.

show abstract

The War Power and Its Limits

Cited by 29 publications

References 2 publications

Policy overreaction

Policy overreaction

Lincoln's Example: Executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism

The Contemporary Presidency: Judicial Restraint and the New War Powers

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About