The Way we Were: How Histories of Co-Governance Alleviate Partisan Hostility

Abstract

Comparative politics scholars argue that consensual democratic institutions encourage power-sharing that promotes “kinder, gentler” politics. We uncover one reason why this is the case: elite inter-party cooperation in consensual systems is associated with reduced inter-party hostility in the mass public. This is because governing parties’ supporters feel much more warmly toward their coalition partner(s) than we can explain based on policy agreement alone. Moreover, these warm affective evaluations linger long after the coalition itself has dissolved. We substantiate our arguments via analyses of CSES survey data from 19 Western democracies between 1996 and 2017, showing that current and past co-governance is associated with substantially warmer inter-party affective evaluations. This implies that electoral systems which encourage coalition governance may defuse partisan hostility.

Who Dislikes Whom? Affective Polarization between Pairs of Parties in Western Democracies

“…With respect to policy, we find that the rise of cultural issues in Western politics matters not only for partisan strategies and vote choices (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al 2008), but also for interparty hostility. With respect to institutions, our findings support the argument that proportional electoral systems produce “kinder, gentler” politics than do majoritarian democracies (Drutman 2019; Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020; Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2022; Lijphart 2010) by encouraging the formation of coalition governments that prompt positive affective evaluations between their members. At the same time, proportional systems may intensify affective polarization by facilitating the rise of intensely disliked radical right parties.…”

“…Lijphart (2010) advances the influential argument that proportional voting systems with coalition governments promote “kinder, gentler” politics compared to majoritarian democracies. Moreover, previous work does indeed show that mass-level affective polarization tends to be less intense in multiparty systems (Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020; Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2022; McCoy and Somer 2019). Our finding that governing parties' supporters grant a large “affective bonus” to coalition partners uncovers one mechanism behind Lijphart's argument, as it implies that co-governance defuses interparty hostility.…”

“…Research about hostility across party lines, that is, affective polarization , has until recently focused on the United States (Druckman and Levendusky 2019; Iyengar et al 2019). Yet, a growing comparative affective polarization literature has emerged (Adams et al 2022; Bassan-Nygate and Weiss 2022; Boxell, Genzkow, and Shapiro 2020; Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2020; Harteveld 2021a, Harteveld 2021b; Hernandez, Anduiza, and Rico 2021; Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020; Horne, Adams, and Gidron 2022; Lauka, McCoy, and Firat 2018; Reiljan 2020; Wagner 2021; Westwood et al 2018). This research primarily analyzes cross-national variations in affective polarization.…”

Exploring differences in affective polarization between the Nordic countries

“…First, ideological identification and patterns of party cooperation become better sorted (Mason, 2018), thus making it easier for people to identify parties as different from themselves in terms of both ideology and as members of a competing party bloc. Second, there should be a depolarizing effect of cross‐bloc cooperation more generally (Gidron et al, 2022; Horne et al, 2022). Third, ideological differences should be clearer and more salient when there are ideological party blocs competing for power.…”

Populism and the affective partisan space in nine European publics: Evidence from a cross-national survey

“…Concerns over citizens' dislike, distrust, and contempt toward partisan opponents, i.e., affective polarization, have intensified in recent years. While the canonical affective polarization studies pertain to the American public (Lelkes and Westwood, 2017;Iyengar et al, 2019), a growing comparative literature extends this perspective outside the United States (see, e.g., Reiljan, 2020;Boxell et al, 2020;Gidron et al, , 2022Harteveld, 2021;Wagner, 2021;Adams et al, 2022;Horne et al, 2022).…”