Collective intelligence and individual intelligence are usually considered to be fundamentally different. Individual intelligence is uncontroversial. It occurs in organisms with special neural machinery, evolved by natural selection to enable cognitive and learning functions that serve the fitness benefit of the organism, and then trained through lifetime experience to maximise individual rewards. Whilst the mechanisms of individual intelligence are not fully understood, good models exist for many aspects of individual cognition and learning. Collective intelligence, in contrast, is a much more ambiguous idea. What exactly constitutes collective intelligence is often vague, and the mechanisms that might enable it are frequently domain-specific. These cannot be mechanisms selected specifically for the purpose of collective intelligence because collectives are not (except in special circumstances) evolutionary units, and it is not clear that collectives can learn the way individual intelligences do since they are not a singular locus of rewards and benefits. Here, we use examples from evolution and developmental morphogenesis to argue that these apparent distinctions are not as categorical as they appear. Breaking down such distinctions enables us to borrow from and expand existing models of individual cognition and learning as a framework for collective intelligence, in particular connectionist models familiar in the context of neural networks. We discuss how specific features of these models inform the necessary and sufficient conditions for collective intelligence, and identify current knowledge gaps as opportunities for future research.