2005
DOI: 10.2307/25443100
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The Weedy West: Mobile Nature, Boundaries, and Common Space in the Montana Landscape

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Cited by 41 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…In another example, Fiege (2005) describes how the 'transboundary ecology' of weeds in Montana (in the western U.S.) created an ecological commons in the first half of the 20th century that bore no relationship to the extant grid of private property. In response, farmers, scientists, NGOs, and government officials built and strengthened the regional networks necessary to address the problem.…”
Section: Social Capital and Weedsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In another example, Fiege (2005) describes how the 'transboundary ecology' of weeds in Montana (in the western U.S.) created an ecological commons in the first half of the 20th century that bore no relationship to the extant grid of private property. In response, farmers, scientists, NGOs, and government officials built and strengthened the regional networks necessary to address the problem.…”
Section: Social Capital and Weedsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, motivating residents to effectively manage IS across private lands may be particularly difficult because the failure of one resident to manage IS on his or her property can create a reservoir for invasion, increasing the costs and difficulty of control for surrounding residents (Klepeis et al 2009, Epanchin-Niell et al 2010. IS control across private lands is therefore a transboundary environmental problem, necessitating the coordinated efforts of many landowners (Fiege 2005, Klepeis et al 2009). To achieve widespread reductions in IS populations, residents must be motivated to not only engage in IS control on their own property, but also participate in collective IS control actions, such as teaching neighbors how to engage in control efforts and applying peer pressure (Graham 2013).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Results show that cooperative or centralized management of an invasion is generally needed to achieve socially optimal levels. Cooperative control can arise both in practice and in theory as landowners seek to internalize the externalities generated from invasion spread Fiege 2005;Hershdorfer et al 2007;Wilen 2007;Bhat and Huffaker 2007). For example, landowners may pay their neighbors to increase their management efforts, agree to share the costs of control, or simply coordinate their efforts in a beneficial way to minimize spillover effects.…”
Section: The Role Of Private Decision-makers In Invasion Controlmentioning
confidence: 99%