The Whistleblower's Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Early Warning System for Public Health Emergency

Abstract

The outbreak of a disease is presenting a serious challenge to China’s current public health emergency management system. Despite of China’s emergency preparedness is showing a good overall progress, gaps remain in the implementation of effective early warning system. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using MATLAB, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. The stable strategies for early warning system for public health emergency are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of the whistleblowing in managing public health emergency. Yet our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting the public health emergency preparedness.