The will to sanction: How sensitive are caseworkers to recipients’ responsibility when imposing sanctions on non‐compliance in a welfare‐to‐work programme?

Abstract

The activation trend in social policy entails that caseworkers on the frontlines of the welfare state are expected to decide ‘reasonable’ activation requirements for clients and when and how non‐compliance should be sanctioned. This study investigates how caseworkers form judgements about their clients’ personal responsibility when activation requirements are violated and how their judgements about responsibility matter for the sanctions they impose. We find that caseworkers are sensitive to personal responsibility, varying the motivation for not fulfilling the activation requirement from a case where the client has less control (circumstances) to one with more control (choice) more than doubles sanctions.

Dilemmas when implementing conditional cash transfers: Lessons for Ghana and the rest of us

“…Resource constraints on administration is less of a problem in high‐income countries, but the ethical dilemma is similar. Also in activation schemes, administrators must contemplate that sanctions may push beneficiaries – and their children – deeper into poverty; a dilemma reported to create ambivalence and cross‐pressure among street‐level administrators (Zacka, 2017; Torsvik, Molander and Terum, 2021). However, this ethical dilemma is, so to speak, more existential for administrators in charge of CCTs in low‐ and middle‐income countries, since in these countries there is seldom a “social protection floor” beneath the CCT – there is no minimum safety net of last resort that guarantees that sanctioned beneficiaries avoid outright deprivation.…”

Etuussanktioiden vaikutukset toimeentuloon, hyvinvointiin ja palveluihin osallistumiseen

“…Saksassa ja Tanskassa harkintavallan käyttö sanktioinnissa vaihtelee työvoimatoimistojen toimintakulttuurien mukaan, mikä selittää osaltaan alueellisia eroja sanktioiden määrissä (25,75). Sanktioiden harkinta perustuu sääntöjen ja toimistokohtaisten käytänteiden ohella viranomaisten subjektiivisiin arvioihin siitä, onko työtön omalla toiminnallaan ansainnut rangaistuksen, minkälainen asenne hänellä on työnhakuun, onko hänen mahdollista vaikuttaa omaan työllistymiseensä tai edesauttaako sanktiointi hänen työnhakuaan (76)(77)(78)(79)(80)(81). Työvoimaviranomaiset voivat antaa jopa työttömän ulkonäön, puhetavan ja kehonkielen ohjata tulkintaa työttömän "kelvollisuudesta" työttömyysetuuteen (81).…”

Sanctioning the sick: Do perceptions of activating the sick and diagnosis matter?

“…Research indicates that the main challenges for FWs working with sick recipients are capacity assessment and setting reasonable activity requirements (Geiger, 2017; Gjersøe, 2016), and it is assumed that implementing conditionality for this group is experienced as more difficult than for the unemployed (Geiger, 2017). Regarding the latter, previous studies indicate that FWs' perceptions of recipient attributes and attitudes—such as ethnicity, unfavourable behaviour, and personal responsibility—affects their decisions approach to conditionality and sanctioning (De Wilde & Marchal, 2019; Schram et al, 2009; Terum et al, 2018; Torsvik et al, 2021). Less is known, however, about the importance of health‐related factors on FWs' decision making.…”

“…This article examines FWs' discretionary administration of welfare conditionality for recipients of health benefits. Previous studies indicate that FWs' perceptions of welfare reforms, as well as recipients' attributes, affect their assessments and decisions (Schram et al, 2009; Torsvik et al, 2021). Our study explores the importance of workers' perceptions of both the sick recipients' attributes and obligations within the context of an activation scheme.…”