The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note

Abstract

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accuracy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

A Hybrid Matryoshka and a Monastery

“…The post-Cold-War world order is a transient phase, a temporary transformational phenomenon, which so far does not have an established definition in political science. The notorious "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer, 1990) or "pluralistic unipolarity" (Bogaturov, 2003) had ended by the mid-2000s and are not quite relevant to the 1 for differences between the parties in how they interpret the essence of nuclear deterrence and its stability, which contributed to the creation of significant counterforce capabilities at that time, see, for example, Snyder, 1977;hines, 1995. for the security dilemma arising from the exaggeration of counterforce capabilities of the enemy amid a lack of information about its advanced programs, see Podvig, 2008. point at issue. The term a 'multipolar' (or 'polycentric') world promoted by the Russian school of thought as well as the "community of shared destiny for all humankind" promoted by China refer more to the desirable end result of this transition rather than to its essence.…”

Haciendo posible lo impensable: opciones selectivas, disuasión a medida y fallos en la disuasión nuclear (1974-1994)

“…UU. (Cimbala, 2014: 244-50;Adamsky, 2013: 9-11;Podvig, 2008). Estas valoraciones desataron la alarma en Washington y mediaron para que Jimmy Carter (1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981) solicitara en la Directiva Presidencial 18 (PD-18) de 1977 revisar la política de selección de objetivos nucleares.…”

Pushing theory beyond the brink

“…Kroenig only cites an interview with a Russian think tank expert as a basis for concluding that Russia prioritizes the counterforce mission, but this judgment is not likely correct. In fact, past research has indicated that Russia never attempted to acquire a counterforce capability (Podvig, 2008: 121) nor would have been able to take advantage of its alleged potential (Garthoff, 2001: 325–334, as cited in Podvig, 2008: 121).…”