The World Just Is the Way It Is

Builes, David

doi:10.1093/monist/onaa023

Cited by 21 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…1212For a sampling of Qualitativist views, see Van Cleve (1985), Hawthorne and Cortens (1995), Dasgupta (2009, 2017), Builes (2021a), and Turner (2011). For a sampling of arguments against qualitativism, see Kment (2012), Cowling (2017), and Turner (2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

Lawful Persistence

Builes

Teitel

2022

Philosophical Perspectives

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The central aim of this paper is to use a particular view about how the laws of nature govern the evolution of our universe in order to develop and evaluate the two main competing options in the metaphysics of persistence, namely endurantism and perdurantism. We begin by motivating the view that our laws of nature dictate not only qualitative facts about the future, but also which objects will instantiate which qualitative properties. We then show that both traditional doctrines in the metaphysics of persistence must take on surprising further commitments in order to vindicate our universe being law‐governed in this strong sense. For example, we argue that endurantists should adopt a particular version of monism, and that perdurantists should adopt a qualitativist doctrine that dispenses with all individuals at the fundamental level.

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confidence: 99%

Lawful Persistence

Builes

Teitel

2022

Philosophical Perspectives

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“… 7 See, e.g., Fitch ( 1971 ), Paul ( 2017 ), Builes ( 2021 ). The Pythagorean view that our universe is at bottom a universe of mathematical entities is of a broadly similar character.…”

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Qualitative properties and relations

Plate

2021

Philos Stud

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This paper is concerned with two concepts of qualitativeness that apply to intensional entities (i.e., properties, relations, and states of affairs). I propose an account of pure qualitativeness that largely follows the traditional understanding established by Carnap, and try to shed light on its ontological presuppositions. On this account, an intensional entity is purely qualitative iff it does not ‘involve’ any particular (i.e., anything that is not an intensional entity). An alternative notion of qualitativeness—which I propose to refer to as a concept of strict qualitativeness—has recently been introduced by Chad Carmichael. However, Carmichael’s definition presupposes a highly fine-grained conception of properties and relations. To eliminate this presupposition, I tentatively suggest a different definition that rests on a concept of perspicuous denotation. In the penultimate section, both concepts of qualitativeness are put to work in distinguishing between different ‘grades’ of qualitative discriminability.

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“…Also, in defence of this point, there many philosophers who think that monism of this sort is compatible with (or even suggested by) contemporary science. For a small sample of such views, see Horgan and Potrč (2008), Schaffer (2009) and ( 2010), Le Bihan ( 2016) and ( 2018), Perry (2017), and Builes (2021).…”

Section: Event Monism: Introducing the Primordial Eventmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Primordial Event & The Eternal Present

Anderson¹

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<p>The appeal to and use of events in philosophical theorising, implicitly or explicitly, is utterly ubiquitous. However, relatively little attention has been given to events themselves, compared to other entities, like objects. This is unfortunate because events are as problematic, if not more so. This thesis has two aims. The first is a ‘negative’ aim. I argue that the two most natural construal of events, that they are entities that occur at some time or over some interval of time, are untenable posits in our ontology and that we should deny that they exist (except for one). This is because they run into problems to do with either Zeno’s paradoxes, the perception of change, or ineliminable arbitrariness in their individuation. The second is a positive aim. I argue that, in light of the negative conclusions reached, we are forced into certain views not only about events, but time as a whole. Namely, I argue that a view I call event monism is true. This is the view that there is single event constitutive of the entire duration of the history of the universe. I defend this view from objections and show that it has far-reaching consequences both for how we conceive of the entities that exist and our role as inquirers into the structure of this event.</p>

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The World Just Is the Way It Is

Cited by 21 publications

References 64 publications

Lawful Persistence

Lawful Persistence

Qualitative properties and relations

The Primordial Event & The Eternal Present

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