Theology, Anti‐Theology and Atheology: From Christian Passions to Secular Emotions

Abstract

The nineteenth‐century transition from talk of passions and affections of the soul to talk of “emotions” in English‐language psychological thought is taken as a case‐study in the secularisation of psychology. This transition is used as an occasion to re‐evaluate the methodologies of John Milbank and Richard Webster, who interpret certain secular scientific accounts as forms of theology or anti‐theology “in disguise”. It is suggested, in the light of the study of the emergence of the secular concept of ‘emotions’, that the category of “atheology” be used to supplement their methodology. “Atheological” texts are not merely theology or anti‐theology in disguise but are a novel form of discourse, which is alienated from the assumptions and metaphors of traditional theologies (and which replaces them with physiological evolutionary narratives) but which is not necessarily atheistic or anti‐theological.

Emotion Pedagogies: What Are They, and Why Do They Matter?

“…Given the large scale of EPs and the ubiquitous presence of discourses of emotion and concerns with emotionality, it can be easy to forget that the very concept of emotion is relatively recent—more recent than the “subjective turn,” which began as far back as the Romantic era. The category of “the emotions” did not even appear in the Anglophone West until the 1820s, when the ostensibly value‐neutral term displaced value‐laden contrasts (particularly the “bad” passions and the relatively “good” affections inherited from Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and the Protestant Reformer, John Wesley (Dixon :302). That dichotomy only gave way when Thomas Brown pioneered the creation of a scientific psychology, becoming “the first major mental philosopher to replace ‘passions and affections’ with [the single category] ‘emotions’ in his “ Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind ()” (Dixon :305).…”

“…The category of “the emotions” did not even appear in the Anglophone West until the 1820s, when the ostensibly value‐neutral term displaced value‐laden contrasts (particularly the “bad” passions and the relatively “good” affections inherited from Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and the Protestant Reformer, John Wesley (Dixon :302). That dichotomy only gave way when Thomas Brown pioneered the creation of a scientific psychology, becoming “the first major mental philosopher to replace ‘passions and affections’ with [the single category] ‘emotions’ in his “ Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind ()” (Dixon :305). Consciousness of “emotion(s)” in the West has increased since “the emotions” hit the scene and has exploded since the emergence of the psy‐disciplines (Rose ) that make emotion their object and turn engagement with subjectivities into a legitimate and increasingly mandatory concern (Beatty ; Matza ).…”

“Very Affecting and Evangelical”: Andrew Fuller (1754-1815) and the Evangelical Renewal of Pastoral Theology

“…While to modern readers "affections" usually connotes emotion and feeling over against reason and intellect, to Fuller and his eighteenth-century contemporaries the use of the language of the affections was more nuanced and comprehensive, and in fact quite successfully integrated, rather than set at odds, mind and heart. 31 Wallis' description of Fuller's pastoral ministry as "very affecting and evangelical" also suggests the mutual importance of the terms, for the language of the heart was a kind of evangelical accent to accompany evangelical doctrinal content. The affections were emphasized in concert with orthodox doctrine, reflecting a concern for a heartfelt response to the gospel -for a voluntary, sincere, and personal Christianity, as opposed to rationalism, nominalism, or cold orthodoxy.…”

Naturalistic Methodology in an Emerging Scientific Psychology: Lotze and Fechner in the Balance

“…As work became more and more specialized and methods standardized, the physiological psychology of the senses became largely autonomous from philosophy of mind and from the theology of the person. Although in many ways a difficult story to tell as a clean emergence of disciplinary autonomy (Dixon 1999;Hatfield 1997), I consider it safe to say that the naturalization of sensory psychology is a chapter in the history of a methodologically naturalistic (near) consensus.…”