Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Interest Groups

Abstract

The evolution of theorizing by political scientists about the role of interest groups in U.S. politics is explored in this article. Critiques of pluralism and the problems of measuring power are described. The dynamics of mobilization and refinements to incentive theory are outlined. The changing conceptions of how influence is structured through subgovernments, issue networks, and advocacy coalitions are examined. Models of lobbying and changing conceptions of group-state engagement are discussed. The article concludes with a discussion of the need to reframe conceptions of interest and influence to reflect new economic, political, and social contexts that are better captured by postpluralist and social movement theory.

Data, censorship, and politics: Analyzing the restricted flow of information in federal scientific policy development

“…Kevin (Case #2) essentially agreed with this perspective, adding, “the development of policy always means that you're dealing with establishing some set of values or value criteria and then applying them to the facts that have been developed.” Science policy, therefore, was not the final or sole authority in policy‐making. In the contemporary, pluralistic U.S. policy arena, economic, political, and social values had to be accommodated (Mawhinney, ; Schiller, ; Spicer, ; for a congruent but different theoretical view, see Sabatier, ). Interestingly, Regis, Michael, and Kevin were all portrayed in the media as restricting access to science policy.…”

“…So we worked very closely with industry.” Through this process, Regis explained, one could better secure cooperation from the industrial sector, resulting in less litigation, less shirking, and better overall compliance (see discussions of the “iron triangle” of policy‐making for further analysis of the interconnected relationships between industry, the executive branch, and Congress; Adams, ; McKay, ). Regis noted that some people disapprove of cooperating with industry at any level, but implied that was not a very successful approach (see Mawhinney, ; Sabatier, ).…”

Organizações E Ambiente Legal: A Construção Do Sistema De Identificação Civil Brasileiro

“…Nessa concepção, as ações coletivas são tratadas como moedas de troca por atores sociais, cuja percepção de benefícios se dá com base em incentivos materiais e tangíveis. Segundo Mawhinney (2001), extensões do estudo de Olson (1999) levaram à reflexão acerca de incentivos intangíveis que possibilitam a mobilização de atores sociais rumo a ações coletivas votadas à execução de interesses comuns.…”

“…Sob a concepção aqui defendida, o formalismo típico das prescrições legais e a suposição de que as organizações são por elas regidas coercitivamente retratam apenas superficialmente a questão. Isso ocorre porque os textos legais, nas suas múltiplas formas, são passíveis de interpretações acerca de sua aplicabilidade, alcance e validade no campo organizacional (Crubellate, Mendes, & Leonel, 2009;Mahoney & Thelen, 2010;Mawhinney, 2001), o que implica admitir diferentes concepções de legalidade, atuantes sobre o comportamento de organizações (Edelman & Suchman, 1997;Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999;Scott, 2008). Do exposto, atores sociais, como organizações públicas ou privadas, não são vistos como meros condutores de significados provenientes do formalismo legal, mas agentes capazes de se engajar ativamente na política, na produção e manutenção de significados, sendo, portanto, considerados signifying agents (Benford & Snow, 2000).…”

On the Nature and Strategies of Organized Interests in Health Care Policy Making

“…For other actors, such as unions and professional associations, it would also prove quite hard to link either their origin or their membership to material incentives. Both institutional factors (Meyer & Rowan, 1991;Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) and state regulation (Mawhinney, 2001;Walker, 1983Walker, , 1991 could probably explain their existence, with their interest group status being a by-product. But more fundamentally, in both cases, they are either memberless groups or compulsory membership groups.…”