Theoretical framework and comparative analysis of Cuba, Venezuela, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China

Abstract

The models of autocracy promotion are four: a) Military intervention, through a war. b) Economic blackmail: by applying negative sanctions to pro-West democratizing regimes: trade or investments’ sanctions, and cuts to economic or military aid. c) Rewards: by positive sanctions to authoritarian or hybrid regimes, through diplomatic pressure, military and economic assistance. d) Spontaneous emulation: an authoritarian state is a cultural, economic, political and military model for other non-democratic regimes, that autonomously follow the leader. A rigid autocracy promotion is based on the support of only authoritarian regimes, while in a flexible relation there is the possibility of a ‘B plan’, by promoting hybrid regimes too. Hard power relations are anchored to direct military interventions, while soft power is based on emulation, diplomatic, economic, indirect military inducements and blackmails. The cases under review in this issue are: China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Cuba and Venezuela.

The autocracy promotion of Turkey in Northern Africa, Middle East, and Caucasus

“…In addition, spontaneous emulation resulting from independent action by third countries, should also be considered. In order to draw considerations, it is now necessary to combine the analysis of the type of support Ankara has resorted to (political, economic, military or cultural), with the theoretical concepts related to the distinction between flexible and rigid autocracy promotion (referring to intervention in hybrid or non democratic countries, respectively), as well as with the distinction between hard and soft power (considering the use of direct action, or not), hence the typology presented by Fossati (2022).…”

Egyptian Autocracy Promotion in Libya and Tunisia

“…Per questo è possibile affermare che c'è stata una forte emulazione di Saïed nei confronti di al-Sisi. Il documento passa poi a collocare i due casi all'interno della tipologia di Fossati (2022). Pertanto, è possibile giungere alla conclusione che la promozione dell'autocrazia egiziana in Libia è stata rigida fino al 2020, quando al-Sisi ha sostenuto solo Haftar, ma è diventata flessibile dopo il 2020, quando al-Sisi ha iniziato a negoziare con il governo di Tripoli.…”

“…Egypt has, in fact, promoted autocracy in Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan. As for the models of autocracy promotion, there are four (Fossati, 2022): military intervention (most frequent during the Cold War), economic blackmail (which consists of applying sanctions to pro-Western democratic regimes), rewards (aid to authoritarian and hybrid regimes through military and economic assistance), and spontaneous emulation (when countries voluntarily take a cue from an authoritarian regime).…”

“…He decided early on to eliminate the opposition, for example by having numerous members of the Muslim Brotherhood arrested and declared to be a terrorist organization. Fossati (2022), it is necessary to analyze and establish the type of linkage between the various Libyan political actors and Egyptian President el-Sisi. El-Sisi has officially supported Haftar since 2014, the year of Operation Dignity, an operation aimed at attacking pro-fundamentalist militias in Benghazi.…”