Theoretical vs. empirical power indices: Do preferences matter?

Badinger, Harald; Mühlböck, Monika; Nindl, Elisabeth; Reuter, Wolf Heinrich

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.009

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Another remarkable similar case relates to Spain, which is supposed to lose voting power in an abstract index approach whereas we show that it actually gained support when looking at actual voting behaviour. Our conclusions also differ significantly from Badinger et al (2014) who present a theoretical and an empirical approach using the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices; in the latter, the voting-power indices are adjusted in such a way that the preferences of Member States, estimated using an item-response model, are taken into account. In this approach small countries like Estonia have low voting-power indices, whereas we come to the opposite conclusion that the positions taken by Estonia get relatively high support in the Council, on account of their alignment with many other countries with a bigger voting weight.…”

Section: Influence In the Councilcontrasting

confidence: 99%

“…The indices can also be used for a preference-based analysis, empirical versions of them are discussed by Edelmann (1997), Pajala and Widgrén (2004) and Perlinger (2000). Badinger et al (2014) use empirical and theoretical indices and discusses the differences between the two. In such an approach it is thus not possible to distinguish between abstentions and no-votes, nor to take into account the information conveyed by voting statements that Member States of the EU can make.…”

Section: 18mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Influence in the EU: Measuring Mutual Support

Fantini

Staal

2017

J of Common Market Studies

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We assess a country's influence on decision-making in the Council not merely on the basis of the number of its votes, but based on a novel measure that also takes into account the voting behaviour of other countries. A country that is likely to receive support from other countries will be more influential than a country with more votes, but which tends to be isolated in its policy preferences. We apply the methodology to a novel dataset and use it to assess whether changes in voting weights in the Lisbon Treaty influence the odds of whether countries get what they want when decisions are taken in the Council. We show that large Member States are less successful in getting support from others for their positions, while the changes in voting weights increase large Member States' influence, but statistically significant decrease it only for a subgroup of small Member States.

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Section: Influence In the Councilcontrasting

confidence: 99%

Section: 18mentioning

confidence: 99%

Influence in the EU: Measuring Mutual Support

Fantini

Staal

2017

J of Common Market Studies

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show abstract

“…Finally, in addition to these applications, some authors have developed empirical voting power indices that incorporate information on voter preferences (e.g. Pajala and Widgrén, 2004;Badinger et al, 2014). In these empirical approaches, the authors propose rules that limit the number of winning coalitions by locating voting bodies relative to each other in a uni-dimensional policy space.…”

Section: Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Producer heterogeneity and voting power in mandatory US agricultural marketing organisations

Plakias

Goodhue

2015

Eur Rev Agric Econ

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“…1 Kaniovski (2008) has made promising progress in this direction. 2 See, for instance, the use by Badinger et al (2013) of web scraping tools that are provided at http://api.epdb.eu/ in order to gather a data set of almost 70,000 individual voting decisions of EU member states on more than 3,000 proposals.…”

Section: Positive Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%