Theories of Economic Regulation

Posner, Richard A.

doi:10.2307/3003113

Cited by 1,203 publications

(567 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…A central thesis of Stigler (1971) is that regulation will be acquired, designed, and operated by an industry for its benefit. Posner (1971) refines the thesis by recognizing that regulation will serve "the private interests of politically effective groups (pg. 343)," and that "regulation is supplied in response to the demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximize the incomes of their members (pg.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legislated Adjustment of Labor Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 1880 to 1894

Gotkin

1997

J. Eco. History

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legislated Adjustment of Labor Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 1880 to 1894

Gotkin

1997

J. Eco. History

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“…It is interesting to divide this literature into three approaches to explain government regulation, namely demanddriven explanations, supply-driven explanations and explanations incorporating the interaction between demand and supply (Keohane, Revesz and Stavins, 1998). The economic theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971 ;Posner, 1974 ;Becker, 1983) suggests that much regulation is not imposed on firms but is demanded by them. For some industries, new regulation can be a powerful instrument in rent-seeking strategies when market entry and prices can be influenced according to the interests of existing firms.…”

Section: Theories For Environmental Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Schumpeter and the Rise of Modern Environmentalism

Albrecht

Gobbin

2001

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (CSD, 1942), Schumpeter presents his paradoxal thesis that capitalism will destroy its own foundation, not by failure but by its success. He argues that the emergence of unfavorable circumstances will activate strong opposition from social critics and intellectuals. Considering the recent growth in national and international environmental legislation and the subsequent emergence of rather vague ecological concepts like sustainable development and the precautionary principle -both challenging economic growth -one could argue that modern environmentalism is one of the most powerful forces that will further impact capitalism as we know it. Did Schumpeter foresee this evolution and what are the mechanisms that did lead to this situation? We discuss aspects of Schumpeterian issue entrepreneurship and relate these to theories on the emergence of environmental regulation, the expansion of environmental organizations, the use of new instruments in environmental policy and pro-active business strategies. Where possible, recent developments in climate policy, acid rain policy and biotechnology policy are integrated in the analysis. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification : A14, B31, Q20

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“…The public choice theory of legislation and regulation stems from the work of Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), and Peltzman (1976), among others. Legislators seek election and re-election.…”

Section: Why Choose To Mandate?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Employer‐Sponsored Health Insurance and Mandated Benefit Laws

Jensen

Morrisey

1999

Milbank Quarterly

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Regulations for the content of private health plans, called mandated benefit laws, are widespread and growing in the United States, at both state and federal levels. Three aspects of these laws are examined: their current scope; some economic reasons for their existence; and the theory and empirical evidence for their effects in health insurance markets. A growing body of literature suggests that society is paying a high price for enhanced coverage via mandated benefits. These laws increase insurance premiums, cause declines in wages and other fringe benefits, and lead some employers and their workers to forgo health benefits altogether. The cost of mandated benefit laws falls disproportionately on workers in small firms.

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Theories of Economic Regulation

Cited by 1,203 publications

References 6 publications

The Legislated Adjustment of Labor Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 1880 to 1894

The Legislated Adjustment of Labor Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 1880 to 1894

Schumpeter and the Rise of Modern Environmentalism

Employer‐Sponsored Health Insurance and Mandated Benefit Laws

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