Theorizing with/out “Mediators”

Abstract

Mediation is one of the most often cited concepts in current cultural-historical theory literature, in which cultural actions and artifacts are often characterized as mediators standing between situational stimuli and behavioral responses. Most often presented as a means to overcome Cartesian dualism between subject and object, and between individual and society, some scholars have nonetheless raised criticism suggesting that such mediators are problematic for a dialectical psychology that takes a unit analysis (monist) approach. In fact, Spinoza develops a monist theory of mind and body that goes without and even excludes every form of mediation. In this study, we follow up on the latter criticisms and explore what we consider to be problematic uses of the notion of mediation as an analytical construct in the literature. We elaborate an empirically grounded discussion on the ways the concept of mediation may lead to dualistic readings; and we offer an alternative account where the notion of mediator is not needed. We conclude discussing prospects for and implications of a cultural-historical theory where the notion of mediation no longer is invoked to account for human action and development.

Meaning and the mediation of emotional experience: Placing mediational meaning at the center of psychological processes

“…Those who assume the objective existence of meaning use versions of the triadic unit of analysis; those who assume that meaning is purely subjective, an epiphenomenon, something that does not really exist in itself as an objective phenomenon, use versions of the dyadic unit of analysis (in which meaning is left aside). This gives rise to an ontological discussion that falls well beyond the scope of this paper (Jovanović, 2019;Mammen & Mironenko, 2015;Roth & Jornet, 2019;Vygotsky, 1997), but it is important to note that the proposals presented here imply the adoption of some version of a triadic unit of analysis and, therefore, the assumption of the ontological existence of meaning.…”

Ideal in mathematics

“…Consistent with the latter take, it has been shown that we can theorize learning without this concept (Roth, 2007;Roth & Jornet, 2019). The concept of mediation is necessary only when two things are external to each other (e.g., Mikhailov, 2004), such as body (extension) and mind (thought) in the Cartesian formulation.…”

“…In the same spirit, Vygotsky (1987) notes that thought only becomes in speech; but as speech, a physical thing, unfolds, the environment is changed, and, therefore, in a reciprocal movement, experience [pereživanie] and thinking (Vygotsky, 2001). In the Spinozist-Marxian approach taken here, there is no mediator (Negri, 1991;Roth & Jornet, 2019), just a double movement from abstract (thinking) to concrete (speech) and from concrete (speech) to abstract (thinking). Thus, just as the commodity does not mediate between the parties, because at the instant of the exchange it is in the hands of both, so the sign is not mediating between Jeanne and Mario because the (physical) word is the same for both; and just as the commodity does not mediate between exchange-value and use-value because these are manifestations of the social relation, so the sign does not mediate between Jeanne and Mario, as some suggest (e.g., Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2014), because any differences are characteristics of the social relation and mind (e.g.…”

Psykologi i en varmere verden

“…For individer er med i at konstituere, producere, vedligeholde og bestandigt udvikle standardiserede praksisser. Andre har i forskellige optikker kaldt sådanne praksisser for transindividuelle relationer (Balibar, 2016(Balibar, , 2020, efter filosoffen Gilbert Simondon), sociale praksisser i samfundsmaessige kontekster (Dreier, 2008(Dreier, , 2019 og transaktionelle relationer (Roth, 2019). Det vaesentlige er, at flere psykologer o.a.…”