Theory and Design of Blink Jamming

Abstract

Establishing an error in the angle estimates of a monopulse radar is critical to creating miss distance during the terminal stage of missile engagements. However, the tools for creating angle deception are limited, with blink jamming offering significant potential. This paper fills in the conceptual gaps in understanding of blink jamming, through a theoretical analysis, which is validated using modelling and simulation, including hardware-in-the-loop with a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). Additionally, a novel version of blink jamming is proposed, using a synchronized amplitude modulation, and its performance compared to traditional, unmodulated blink jamming. The complete results are discussed, with design guidance provided for implementing blink jamming in operational scenarios.

Deceptive signal generating optimization based on frequency diverse array

“…(2) Phase radiation pattern: Through the phase difference of the same signal received by each element of the receiver, the phase-based reconnaissance system can measure the direction of the incoming wave. However, from ( 3), (6), and ( 8), we can know with the introducing of the frequency increments, the phase difference of FDA is influenced by the range, time, and the frequency increments, that means, the FDA signals do not follow the principle of the phase-based reconnaissance system. Therefore, the FDA may deceive the phase-based reconnaissance system.…”

“…According to the location of spatial configuration, the jammers can be divided into off‐board jamming (towed decoy [4], and et al.) and onboard jamming (no‐coherent jamming [5, 6], cross‐polarization jamming [7, 8], cross‐eye jamming [9, 10], and et al.). (2) Low probability of intercept (LPI) waveform implementation [11, 12]: by reducing the signal energy, the probability of our radar signals being intercepted is decreased.…”

“…The current methods to protect the radar can be divided into two main parts: (1) Deception jamming for the reconnaissance: by setting jammers around our radar, the signals received by the enemy are deceptive, and thus our radar cannot be located accurately. According to the location of spatial configuration, the jammers can be divided into off-board jamming (towed decoy [4], and et al) and onboard jamming (no-coherent jamming [5,6], cross-polarization jamming [7,8], cross-eye jamming [9,10], and et al). ( 2) Low probability of intercept (LPI) waveform implementation [11,12]: by reducing the signal energy, the probability of our radar signals being intercepted is decreased.…”

The deception effect of FDA counteracting amplitude-comparison monopulse reconnaissance

“…According to the adjacent amplitude-comparison method, the two strongest outputs of the adjacent receivers are found by the direction-finding signal processor, and thus, the DOA of the incoming signal can be determined to be between the two adjacent receivers. Assuming that the two outputs obtained are s n (t, θ ) and s n+1 (t, θ ) , the output voltage difference is When the amplitude response of the receiving branch is consistent, that is, k n = k n+1 , the relationship between the voltage difference u and the signal arrival direction θ is When the receiver is a horn antenna, its beampattern F (θ) is approximately considered as Gaussian function, assuming that its half-power beam width is θ 0.5 , therefore Combining (10) and (11), then Then, the DOA of the signal is estimated as (8) When the receiver is an array antenna, it is generally considered that its beampattern F (θ ) is approximate to the Sinck function, assuming that its zero-power beam width is θ 0 , we have Combining ( 10) and ( 14), then Then, the DOA of the signal is estimated as where solve denotes the solving function.…”

“…The amplitude monopulse direction-finding system is a standard amplitude method reconnaissance system. Recently, three countermeasures have been put in place for the monopulse system: (1) Incoherent jamming [9][10][11]: two or more jammers within the angular resolution unit of the monopulse radar are used for jamming, and since the jamming signals are incoherent, the incoherent jammer does not require the phases of the jamming signals. However, the deception angle is within the connection of jamming sources, meaning that the caused jamming error can be relatively small.…”