Theory contraction through base contraction

Fuhrmann, André

doi:10.1007/bf00284974

Cited by 185 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…It would not be quite right to characterize our proposals as "theory change through base change" [5]. We do not want to stipulate that K-'r = Cn(H-r 1 This should not be confused with the idea that all elements of H are equally well entrenched.…”

Section: Base Contraction and Multiple Contractionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the research program initiated by AlchourrSn, Giirdenfors and Makinson ([3]; for excellent surveys, see [6] and [16]), belief states are identified with belief sets, and inputs are single sentences. Still working in broadly the same research program, Fuhrmann [4,5] and Hansson [9,10,11] offer modetlings for two important generalizations. They investigate what happens when belief states are identified with belief bases (with belief sets as special eases) and when the input comes in sets of sentences (with singletons as special cases).…”

Section: Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)

Rott

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. This paper draws a distinction between the set of explicit beliefs of a reasoner, the "belief base", and the beliefs that are merely implicit. We study syntax-based belief changes that are governed exclusively by the structure of the belief base. In answering the question whether this kind of belief change can be reconstructed with the help of something like an epistemic entrenchment relation in the sense of G~rdenfors and Makinson [8], we extract several candidate relations from a belief base. The answer to our question is negative, but an approximate solution is possible, and in some cases the agreement is even perfect. Two interpretations of the basic idea of epistemic entrenchment are offered. It is argued that epistemic entrenchment properly understood involves multiple belief changes, i.e., changes by sets of sentences. Since none of our central definitions presupposes the presence of propositional connectives in the object language, the notion of epistemie entrenchment becomes applicable to the style of knowledge representation realized in inheritance networks and truth maintenance systems.

show abstract

Section: Base Contraction and Multiple Contractionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)

Rott

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Makinson (1997) observes (with reference to the so-called filtering condition of Fuhrmann (1991), p. 184) that I believe ϕ (that George is a criminal) only because I believe ψ (that George is a murderer). Hence I believe ϕ → ψ, too, only because I believe ψ, so that by giving up ϕ and hence ψ the belief in ϕ → ψ should disappear as well.…”

Section: The Recovery Postulatementioning

confidence: 99%

AGM, Ranking Theory, and the Many Ways to Cope with Examples

Spohn

2013

David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper first explains how the ranking-theoretic belief change or conditionalization rules entail all of the standard AGM belief revision and contraction axioms. Those axioms have met a lot of objections and counter-examples, which thus extend to ranking theory as well. The paper argues for a paradigmatic set of cases that the counter-examples can be well accounted for with various pragmatic strategies while maintaining the axioms. So, one point of the paper is to save AGM belief revision theory as well as ranking theory. The other point, however, is to display how complex the pragmatic interaction of belief change and utterance meaning may be; it should be systematically and not only paradigmatically explored.

show abstract

“…However, in a belief set, there is no difference between the explicitly represented knowledge (i.e., those formulas that are stored in the databases) and the implicitly represented one (i.e., those formulas that are implied by the explicitly represented one). Therefore, many researchers turn to use belief bases, i.e., a finite set of formulas that may not be closed under logical consequence, to represent epistemic sates of an agent (see [7,16,13,14]). In [4], the authors argue that in the context of ontology evolution, it is more natural to differentiate the explicit knowledge and implied knowledge in an ontology.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Revision Approaches in Description Logics

Yang

2008

Web Reasoning and Rule Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Revision of a Description Logic-based ontology to incorporate newly received information consistently is an important problem for the lifecycle of ontologies. Many approaches in the theory of belief revision have been applied to deal with this problem and most of them focus on the postulate or logical properties of a revision operator in Description Logics (DLs). However, there is no coherent view on how to characterize a revision operator in DLs. In this paper, we lay bare the assumptions underlying different approaches for revision in DLs and propose some criteria to compare them. Based on the analysis, we give our definition of a revision operator in DLs and point out some open problems.

show abstract

Theory contraction through base contraction

Cited by 185 publications

References 16 publications

Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)

Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)

AGM, Ranking Theory, and the Many Ways to Cope with Examples

A Survey of Revision Approaches in Description Logics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About