There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Abstract

Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame. My account draws on a prominent line of theorizing in moral philosophy that ties blame to our relationships with one another. I argue that with my account of epistemic blame on hand, the most compelling worries about epistemic blame can be deflated. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. the relationship-based account of epistemic blame on hand, none of them has much force. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. 2 2. The Problem of Cool Judgment Recently, R.J. Wallace (2013) has argued that the sting, force, and depth of blame are to be explained in terms of the idea that blame is essentially a kind of negative emotional response. Blame essentially involves negative reactive attitudes such as indignation, resentment, and guilt (in the case of self-blame). Wallace is not alone in this view. Indeed, he is a prominent voice among a large number of moral philosophers who take a broadly 'Strawsonian' approach to blame (Strawson 1962; Wolf 2013; Menges 2017). Why take such an approach? Consider the familiar distinction between judging that something is valuable, and actually valuing it. Wallace proposes we model the distinction between judging blameworthy and blaming on this distinction. The difference between judging X valuable and actually valuing X comes down to a difference in one's engagement with X. When one values X, one is engaged and exercised by X. One gets excited by opportunities to X, disappointed by missing opportunities to X. Meanwhile, in judging X valuable, one merely recognizes that there are reasons for someone to be so exercised, without yet necessarily being that way oneself. According to Wallace, something similar is true of blame. When one blames someone for doing something, one is engaged and exercised by what they have done. It matters to one that this person has done something bad, or flouted some norm, and by blaming them for it one manifests this concern in an engaged way. Meanwhile, in judging someone blameworthy, one merely judges that there are reasons for one (or someone else) to be so engaged, without yet necessarily being that way oneself. The key point, according to Wallace, is that the emotions are an integral part of what it is for human beings to be 'engaged' and 'exercised' in this way. Imagine someone claiming to value opera without feeling any emotion whatsoever about the prospect of going to the Met. Other things being equal, it would be natural to conclude that they do not actually value opera (even though they might judge it valuable)....

Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

“…We might blame a person without feeling any hostility towards them, e.g., by just ceasing to be friends, or by no longer providing special support to the blamee, or by not taking pleasure in their successes, or by not valuing their opinions in the way we did before, or by developing a general sense of distrust towards them. Recently, especially Boult ( 2020 , 2021 ) has applied these accounts to the epistemic domain. The following sketch of an account of epistemic blame draws on his ideas.…”

“…Since these reactions presuppose responsibility, their potential “coolness” does not, pace Wallace ( 2011 ), count against them as genuine blaming-reactions (cf. Boult, 2020 ). 21…”

“…One problem with this initial formulation is that one’s moral or epistemic community can be epistemically or morally flawed, and thus one might end up impairing one’s relationship with them by being morally or epistemically virtuous. 22 Boult’s ( 2020 ) formulation of the position avoids this problem: one is blameworthy epistemically only if one falls short of the normative ideal of an epistemic relationship—or, in my preferred terminology, only if one displays an epistemic vice. The epistemically virtuous person does not fall short of this ideal even within an epistemically flawed community.…”

“…I suggest that we hold each other answerable to epistemic norms by showing reactive attitudes towards each other’s epistemic failures—mainly suspension of epistemic trust (cf. Boult, 2020 , 2021 ). The normativity of evidence can become intelligible by understanding this practice.…”

Blame as performance

“…Cognitivism about emotions bracketed, of course.21 SeeBrown (2018),Boult (2020), and Piovarchy (2020) for recent work on epistemic blame.…”