There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap

Abstract

In a landmark essay, Andreas Matthias claimed that current developments in autonomous, artificially intelligent (AI) systems are creating a so-called responsibility gap, which is allegedly ever-widening and stands to undermine both the moral and legal frameworks of our society. But how severe is the threat posed by emerging technologies? In fact, a great number of authors have indicated that the fear is thoroughly instilled. The most pessimistic are calling for a drastic scaling-back or complete moratorium on AI systems, while the optimists aim to show that the gap can be bridged nonetheless. Contrary to both camps, I argue against the prevailing assumption that there is a technology-based responsibility gap. I show how moral responsibility is a dynamic and flexible process, one that can effectively encompass emerging technological entities.

Confounding Complexity of Machine Action

“…The machines essentially "assist the animate being" in the realisation of the goals and pursuits of others (usually human beings) (Sacksteder, 1984). This view is similar to the views of Koops, Hildebrandt, and Jaquet-Chiffelle (2010), Bryson (2010), Calo (2015), Nyholm (2018) and (Tigard, 2020). They all argue in favour of traditional approaches involving the attribution of responsibility to human beings, and it will here be shown not only that these approaches can handle complexity, but also that the complexity itself is somewhat illusory.…”

“…This factor, some say, makes it unfair, unintuitive, or simply not right, to attribute responsibility for machine actions to machine makers or operators (Matthias, 2004). As emphasised by Tigard (2020), responsibility can entail attributability, accountability, or answerability. He employs a pluralistic account of moral responsibility and thus extends the analysis of the gaps beyond both law and questions of accountability.…”

“…In this article the core concepts in Thomas Hobbes's framework of representation and responsibility are applied to the question of machine responsibility. This provides a simple and straightforward way of understanding the attribution of machine actions, and simultaneously narrows or eliminates the responsibility gap and retribution gap discussed in the literature on machine agency and responsibility (Danaher, 2016;de Jong, 2019;Gunkel, 2017;Köhler, Roughley, & Sauer, 2018;Nyholm, 2018;Tigard, 2020).…”

Experimental Philosophy of Technology

“…I will focus on a specific line of research in ethics of technology in order to illustrate what the negative program of experimental philosophy of technology entails and how it can advance current debates. Consider the influential argument by Andreas Matthias that increasingly autonomous machines threaten to create a socalled responsibility gap, which has initiated a line of responses regarding potential responsibility gaps in technology (e.g., Champagne & Tonkens, 2015;Nyholm, 2018a;Tigard, 2020). The original argument by Matthias (2004) may be summarized as follows:…”

Automation, work and the achievement gap

“…In doing so, we draw explicit analogies between our concern about the emergence of achievement gaps in the workplace and closely related policy concerns about responsibility gaps arising from the widespread use of automating technologies (e.g. [26,28,29,37,38]). Indeed, we suggest that the achievement gaps we discuss in this paper are a type of positive responsibility gap, and are thus the inverse of the negative responsibility gaps that have attracted a lot of attention in debates about roboethics and AI ethics.…”