Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions

Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict

“…However, adversaries in violent political conflicts often conceptualize the issues under dispute as sacred values (3)(4)(5)(6)(7), such as when groups of people transform land from a simple resource into a ''holy site'' to which they may have noninstrumental moral commitments. Nowhere is this issue more pressing than in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, which people across the world consistently view as the greatest danger to world peace (8).…”

Looking under the bonnet of conservation conflicts: can neuroscience help?

“…Morality, in brief, is about making choices in our daily lives in a resource scarce world (Tetlock 2003;Moll et al 2005). Understanding morality has been the eternal preoccupation of scholarship in both the Humanities (anthropology, law, philosophy to name but a few) and Natural Science (such as psychology and evolutionary biology), so both intellectual spheres will be enriched by the neuroscientists' discovery that human brains are wired for morality (Moll et al 2005).…”

“…Although evidence crucially underpins judgement and although some economists might say everything has an implicit or explicit price (Tetlock 2003), value is, as is often attributed to Oscar Wilde, very different to price, and values can be sacrosanct (Tetlock 2003;Berns et al 2012). For example, for many people, fundamental beliefs and values such as love, honour, national and ethnic identities are practically sacred in nature (Tetlock 2003;Berns et al 2012).…”

“…For example, for many people, fundamental beliefs and values such as love, honour, national and ethnic identities are practically sacred in nature (Tetlock 2003;Berns et al 2012).…”

“…None of this is surprising, but it highlights that any evidence, as might emerge from neuroscience, regarding the way people define and respond to values could be helpful when they are the nub of conservation issues. Research shows that when individuals hold some values, certain commitments and relations to be sacred, they may not reason instrumentally, and thus they fail to make trade-offs (Tetlock 2003). Under these circumstances, established penalties or offered motives in policy programmes have no traction on their choices (Tetlock 2003;Ginges et al 2007;Berns et al 2012).…”