Third Party Intervention and the Bargaining Behavior of Group Representatives

This study examined the dispute-resolution behavior of the " Kressel & Pruitt, 1989, for a discussion of "contractual" and "emergent" mediation).In some cases, the individual who intervenes has (1) organizational authority to dictate the outcome of the dispute and (2) personal interests at stake in the dispute (Rubin, 1981; Walton, 1969).Murnighan (1986) has called such third parties "intravenors"Mediation and arbitration are the two classic modes of third party intervention (Pruitt, 1981 Brett & Goldberg, 1983) suggest that organizations should use mediation.Others (Notz, Starke & Atwell, 1983; Sheppard, 1984;Kolb & Sheppard, 1985) argue (Conlon, 1988 Research at a community mediation center (McGillicuddy et al , 1987) generated results that supported the intravention model. "Mediatorarbitrators" (mediators who later became arbitrators in the same dispute) were more forceful than pure mediators, and disputants were less hostile and competitive and engaged in more problem solving when the third party could control the outcome. Research OverviewThe concern-likelihood model makes predictions for mediators who have little or no self-interest and no control over the outcome of the dispute.Murnighan (1986) argued that intravenors typically threaten to impose settlements, and will rely almost exclusively on pressure and problem solving tactics.The key difference between mediation and intravention, according toMurnighan (1986), is the third party's decision control and incentives: An intravenor will impose outcomes that primarily reflect their own self-interest, and will be less affected by the level of concern for the Intravenors were told that the two managers were their subordinates.They were told that they could impose an outcome if they wished, or they could mediate, make suggestions, or opt out of the negotiation. Thus, our operationalization of mediators and intravenors included role differences (peer vs. boss) and typically concomitant authority differences (power to Intravention 11 suggest vs. power Co impose).Perceived common ground . When perceived common ground was high, Che managers (i.e., che computer programs) made relacively large concessions each round, implying chac chey would ulcimacely agree. The New York managers proposed "AAA", "BAB", "BBB", "CBB" "CCD" , "DCD" , "DDD" , and "DED" ; che Boscon managers proposed "III", "HIH" , "HHH" , "HHG" "FGG" , "FGF" , "FFF" , and "FEF".They were close Co agreemenc afcer eighc rounds. When perceived common ground was low, che managers made smaller concessions: New York's proposals were "AAA", "AAA", "ABA", "ABA" "ABA", "ABB", "ABB", and "BBB"; BosCon's were "III", "III", "IHI", "IHI" "IHI", "HHI", "HHI", and "HHH". They were far from agreemenc afcer eighc rounds.Self -inceresc and concern . Third parcy self -inceresc and concern for che dispucancs ' aspiracions were manipulaced independencly by varying che outcomes in che subjeccs' own payoff cables 3 .Wich low self -inceresc and low concern, che agreemenc between the disputants did not ...

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“…Bartunek, Benton & Keys, 1975;Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992;Notz & Starke, 1978; Pruitt, 1981; Kressel &. Pruitt, 1989;Kolb, 1985).…”

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Intravention: Third-Party Intervention with Clout

Conlon

Carnevale

Murnighan

1994

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

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“…Trust has been defined as calculus, knowledge and identification-based (Irmer 2003;Lewicki and Stevenson 1997). And, identity has been treated as constituent-based representative role obligations (Druckman 1994;Wall 1975; Bartunek et al 1975). Because of these emphases progress in developing theories or frameworks for understanding the role of emotions in negotiation has been slow.…”

Section: The Role Of Emotions In Negotiationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotions in negotiation

Druckman

Olekalns

2007

Group Decis Negot

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In this article, we discuss the ways in which emotions influence the course of negotiation. Emotions play a role in the development of relationships among negotiators; they also facilitate or hinder coordination of strategic exchanges. These functions highlight an interplay between information-processing and emotional expressions: intentions are inferred from statements made and nonverbal gestures sent. They are understood as part of an expression game that emphasizes interaction dynamics. They are also understood in terms of the organizational contexts surrounding negotiation. These are some of the themes that surface in the articles contributed to this special issue. An overview of the articles calls attention to key points but also expands on the themes suggested by the authors. The work reported in this issue provides a basis for a continuing research agenda on emotions in negotiation.

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“…It has been found that mediator suggestions can greatly affect the negotiation process and outcome. For example, studies have shown that mediator suggestions can lead to higher joint outcomes (Podell and Knapp, 1969;Bartunek et al, 1975) and greater concession rates (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970). Two factors appear to come into play.…”

Section: Independent Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of computer intervention and task structure on bargaining outcome

Jones

Jelassi

1990

Theor Decis

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This paper reports on a study that examined the impact of computer presentation of suggested solutions during negotiation, in bargaining situations that can be characterized as integrative or distributive. It was found that in the integrative task, the bargainers achieved higher joint outcomes when presented with suggestions. They had a more negative perception of the negotiation atmosphere, however. In the distributive task, the suggestions did not help achieve joint gains, but it lessened negative attitudes of the bargainers. Bargainers who received suggestions felt both they and their partner had been somewhat more flexible, cooperative, considerate, and less suspicious. Thus, regardless of negotiation situation, the suggestions resulted in some benefit to the negotiators.

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Third Party Intervention and the Bargaining Behavior of Group Representatives

Cited by 74 publications

References 27 publications

Intravention: Third-Party Intervention with Clout

Intravention: Third-Party Intervention with Clout

Emotions in negotiation

The effect of computer intervention and task structure on bargaining outcome

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