Third-party responses to injustice: a review on the preference for compensation

Abstract

People are often confronted with injustice that is done to others. In such cases, observers (i.e. third-parties) of injustice can restore justice by punishing the perpetrator, as shown by a vast amount of research. However, this focus on punishment has led to the neglect of another behavioural option: compensation of the victim. The current review focuses on this latter behavioural option. More specifically, it is argued that third-parties are more compensation-oriented than previous literature appears to demonstrate. To support this argument, previous research is discussed and the factors that might explain observers' preference for compensation are outlined. To conclude, suggestions for future research are presented.

Children endorse deterrence motivations for third-party punishment but derive higher enjoyment from compensating victims

“…This result could be because a generic and abstract sense that moral transgressions have occurred in the past might elicit children's intuitive reaction to endorse punishment. On the other hand, requiring children to attend in real time to the details of the different transgression types might induce them to engage in careful deliberation about whether it is more appropriate to endorse punishment or compensation (Van Doorn & Brouwers, 2017). The preferential endorsement of punishment after justice administration is also indicative of children's transgressor-centred approach to justice restoration.…”

“…In contrast, in studies showing preference for punishment over compensation there were no costs associated with either type of third-party intervention. This could be due to participants acting upon intuition rather than deliberation when they can carry out third-party interventions at no cost to themselves (Van Doorn & Brouwers, 2017).…”

Judging extreme forgivers: How victims are perceived when they forgive the unforgivable

“…In addition to the victims who experience the direct harms of these offences, third parties may also be negatively affected despite not having any personal involvement in the event. As ‘observers of injustice’ (Van Doorn and Brouwers, 2017: 68), third parties are witness to the violation of social and moral codes, and thus will have expectations about how the injustice should be rectified or resolved (Carlsmith and Darley, 2008; Gromet, 2012). Depending on the offence, this may include sanctions against the offender (e.g.…”

“…Depending on the offence, this may include sanctions against the offender (e.g. punishment), and/or compensation to the victim (Van Doorn and Brouwers, 2017). When no such resolution is forthcoming, it violates the justice expectations of the third party, resulting in a perceived justice failure (Zhu et al, 2012).…”

Law and Emotion in Moral Repair: Circumscribing Infringement

“…We are most disturbed by relative deprivation, access to less resources than others in corresponding situations (Walker and Smith, 2002). We also react to injustices against third persons (van Doorn, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans, 2014;Van Doorn and Brouwers, 2017). A sense of justice seems to be universal.…”