This is not an instance of (E)

Abstract

Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the liar sentence expresses a proposition, but he endorses the denial that the liar is an acceptable instance of the equivalence schema (E). This paper has two main parts. It first shows that Horwich's preferred denial is also problematic. As Simmons (1999), Beall and Armour-Garb (2003), and Asay (2015) argued, the solution is ad hoc, faces a possible loss of expressibility, and is ultimately unstable. Finally, the paper explores a different combination of possibilities for minimalism: treating the truth-predicate as context-dependent, rejecting the notion that the liar expresses a proposition, and reinterpreting negation in some contexts as metalinguistic denial. The paper argues that these are preferable options, but signposts possible dangers ahead.

The Importance of Being Erroneous

“…'(Prior, 1967, 228) 9 Compare also Davidson's slingshot argument(Davidson, 2001b). 10 For discussion of the deflationary theory and problems it faces with the liar paradox, seeMarques (2018).11 Frege accepted that 'p' and 'It is true that p' have the same content, so he may have been sympathetic to some aspects of the redundancy theory. But obviously he did not hold a redundancy theory of the True.…”