This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino'sPersonhood in African Philosophy¹

Abstract

The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in African Philosophy enters into this discussion by way of contesting some of the assumptions underlying communitarian approaches. His own critical assessment leads him to what I believe is an unprecedented objection in the literature; the conclusion that communitarian philosophers are involved in a category mistake when framing the question and articulating the notion of personhood. I intend to present a brief summary of the chapters of the book and reflect on some of the main philosophical issues that the book provokes, noting what I take to be refreshing insights that Matolino brings to the discussion while also engaging critically with the ones I find most contentious. In particular, I briefly assess Matolino's implicit suggestion that an Akan inspired quasiphysicalist account of mind avoids the mind-body interaction problem; I object to the category mistake charge on behalf of communitarians; and lastly, I raise questions about, and propose ways Matolino can refine, his proposal concerning a new way of thinking about personhood, which goes under the rubric of Limited Communitarianism.

An outline of the basis for a new Afro-communitarian political theory of democracy

“…The second criticism has targeted my version expressed both in my accounts of communitarianism and personhood. Two representative critics have been Oyowe (2015), who has identified me as a liberal, and Ani (2022), who identifies my account as cosmopolitan. The major target of these criticisms has been that my rendition of communitarianism does not succeed in capturing anything communitarian, hence the alternatives I get branded with.…”

Grounding African political theory on afro-communitarianism: arguments and implications

“…I think extending this relevance in literature is his aim, especially how doing that, philosophically resolves the questions of individual rights in African political philosophy. One may object that the Yoruba and Akan allusion to this part of the human self, captured by Gbadegesin, Wiredu and Gyekye should be sufficient (see Oyowe, 2015). 14 Two reactions may be presented against this objection.…”

“…Attempts at fixing the tension between individual and community have been dominated by the focus on the ideas of personhood, indicating an attention on one side of the Afro-communitarian spectrumthe individual. Wiredu (1995), Matolino (2008;, Oyowe (2015), Chimakonam and Awugosi (2020) are references to the claim on massive attention on the nature of the 'self' in understanding the relation between the individual and community. This is captured in how they conceive the vision of Afro-communitarianism.…”